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viiviii1 Introduction
1.1  Overview and General Research Objective
Liquidity is by far the most important decision-making criterion for investors 
(Schiereck (1995)) and is regarded as the central quality characteristic in 
securities markets. High liquidity means the ability to trade, buy and sell 
securities without impact and movement in the share price. At the macro-
level, liquid capital markets are essential for the efficiency of capital allocation 
in modern economies and lead to low cost of capital for issuers. There is an 
economic   welfare   benefit   from   liquid   markets   because   trading   is   the 
mechanism   through   which   information   is   introduced   into   prices.   More 
informative prices lead to more efficient allocation of capital across competing 
investments (Wurgler (2000)).   At the micro-level, a liquid market enables 
access to a large number of trading interests and thus ensures that investors 
can carry out their transactions at any time.
For all of these reasons, there is considerable interest among investors, 
exchanges and regulators in understanding the determinants of secondary-
market liquidity. 
This doctoral thesis comprises three essays that address selected issues in 
stock market liquidity. All three essays conduct original empirical research 
using data from the German Xetra trading system and the set of stocks that 
belong to German TecDAX index (i.e. mid-cap stocks from technology, 
biotech and renewable energy sectors).  
The first essay (Chapter 3) focuses on the weather effects on the stock 
market liquidity and tests for the potential influence of the cloudy weather on 
liquidity provided by market makers.  The second essay (Chapter 4) focuses 
on the issue of market makers’ effect on liquidity and investigates the role of 
designated sponsors in the Xetra electronic order book and their contribution 
to stock liquidity.  Finally, the third essay (Chapter 5) investigates the intraday 
effect on liquidity.  
Most of the liquidity studies relied on measuring liquidity using only the best 
bid and ask prices. For example, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), 
1Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Halka and Huberman (2001) and Brockman and 
Chung (2002) all measure liquidity by looking at quotes and quantities at best 
prices. However, if investors want to trade large positions, their orders will 
walk up the order book and therefore they will not only care about liquidity at 
best prices, but also about liquidity beyond best prices. The liquidity at the 
best limit prices represents only a fraction of the orders in the limit order book. 
Moreover, best limit prices are very heavily exposed to idiosyncratic shocks 
and attract a lot of noise. 
Other studies of liquidity looked at the situation in the whole order book by 
reconstructing it. However, reconstructing the order book with data that is 
available to researchers often yields results that are less than perfectly 
accurate and might not capture the dynamic price formation aspect of the real 
life order book.
This doctoral thesis aims to add evidence to our understanding of the liquidity 
in stock markets by studying the whole order book in a dynamic setting based 
on the Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM). The German Stock Exchange has 
been calculating XLM based on all information in the order book, i.e. including 
the hidden part of iceberg orders, for all stocks traded continuously in Xetra 
since July 2002. XLM therefore provides a more comprehensive analysis of 
liquidity costs than the bid-ask spread.
The concept of XLM was first developed and described by Gomber and 
Schweickert (2002). Later, Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen (2004) used 
XLM dataset for static and dynamic analysis of the liquidity in the German 
stock market, namely the impact of endogenous and exogenous events, 
intraday liquidity patterns and impact of Bloomberg news ticker on liquidity. 
Hachmeister (2006) also used XLM data studying the behaviour of informed 
traders as liquidity providers in Xetra order book. Hachmeister and Schiereck 
(2010) used XLM data to study the impact of the introduction of pre-trade 
anonymity. Apart from these studies, we failed to identify any other academic 
research based on XLM. Therefore, it can be concluded that the XLM data 
and methodology is still to be classified as innovative in the academic 
research inspite of its clear advantages.
2XLM rates the liquidity of the traded instruments on the basis of a uniform 
methodology and provides investors and researchers with a tool for the 
objective assessment of the trading costs. On this basis, the liquidity of 
individual securities as well as whole marketplaces can be analyzed in a 
comparable and transparent manner.
Overall, the research objective of this doctoral thesis is to improve our 
understanding of the liquidity in stock markets by using XLM data and 
providing new evidence on the effects of weather, market makers and the 
time of the day on liquidity. The research results will be useful for practitioners 
and researchers in this field. For example, the operators of stock exchanges 
will be interested in these results as a way to continue improving their 
respective market models to achieve greater liquidity for the stocks listed and 
traded on their platforms. This provides competitive advantage for stock 
exchanges. The results will also be useful for investors, asset managers and 
trading community from the perspective of designing new trading strategies 
that are profitable net of transaction costs. Moreover, the issuers can use 
these research results to guide their decision on the choice of the listing place 
and the corresponding market model in order to achieve best liquidity for their 
stocks, thus lowering their cost of capital.
1.2  Essay 1: Research Question and Main Findings
The first essay entitled “Xetra Weather the Weather: The Effects of Cloudy 
Skies and Stock Market Liquidity“ investigates the weather effects on stock 
market liquidity. While this phenomenon was first documented for stock 
returns, more recent studies find weather to influence liquidity in stock trading, 
potentially through moods and sentiments of market makers. 
In essence, there is an ongoing debate about the existence of a weather 
effect, and about the direction of the established correlation between cloudy 
skies and liquidity. 
We contribute to this by testing for a potential influence of the weather in 
Frankfurt (Main) on liquidity provided by market makers in the electronic 
trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Rather than using the 
3bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, we apply the exchange liquidity 
measure (XLM) introduced by Gomber et al. (2002). The construction of this 
variable enables us to distinguish between the weather effect on liquidity pro-
vided by the market maker (Designated Sponsor), and its influence on the 
level of liquidity present in the market without the market maker’s activities, 
i.e. natural liquidity.
We examine this question using a sample of daily trading data for a selection 
of 18 stocks that belong to TecDAX index between 1 January 2004 and 31 
December 2005 based on the Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM). 
We find that the more clouds in the sky, the lower are the execution costs, 
and the higher the overall liquidity on Xetra. Remarkably, in such weather, 
market makers inject less liquidity than in sunshine. This could be due to 
market makers being more risk averse on overcast days.
Alternatively, it can be argued that overall liquidity is higher on cloudy days 
than in sunshine, thus market makers add less value in an already rather 
liquid market. This finding complements the results presented in Flemisch et 
al. (2009) in that it addresses directly the weather effect on Designated 
Sponsors. The finding that cloudy skies correspond with overall high liquidity 
in Xetra is inconsistent with the results presented by Goetzmann and Zhu 
(2005) for the New York Stock Exchange and thus it may be the avenue for 
further research.
1.3  Essay 2: Research Question and Main Findings
The   second   essay   entitled   “Designated   Sponsors   on   Xetra   –   Is   One 
Designated Sponsor Enough?“ investigates the role of Designated Sponsors 
in Xetra electronic order book and their contribution to stocks’ liquidity.
While the contribution of market makers to liquidity was first documented for 
dealer (quote-driven) markets (Ho and Stoll (1983), Grossmann and Miller 
(1988) and Leach and Madhavan (1993)), more recent studies find market 
makers to influence the liquidity in the order-driven markets as well. 
4This essay contributes to the ongoing debate about the relation between 
market makers and liquidity by testing the liquidity provided by market makers 
in the electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Rather 
than using bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, we apply the exchange 
liquidity measure (XLM) introduced by Gomber et al. (2002). The construction 
of this variable enables us to distinguish between the effect on liquidity 
provided by the market maker, and the level of liquidity present in the market 
without the market maker’s activities, i.e. natural liquidity. We directly test for 
an effect on liquidity induced by market makers.
The Chapter 4 examines this question using a sample of daily trading data for 
a selection of 16 stocks that belong to TecDAX index between 1 January 
2004 and 31 December 2005. Based on the Exchange Liquidity Measure 
(XLM), we are able to separate the effects of market makers on liquidity and 
the natural liquidity (i.e. unsupported by market makers) in the electronic order 
book Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We find that the presence of 
Designated Sponsors in the order book improves liquidity and decreases total 
XLM. The  tests show that the  increase  from one  to  more  Designated 
Sponsors in a stock brings further benefits to liquidity.  Especially large 
improvement   is   achieved   in   the   move   to   three   Designated   Sponsors. 
Consistent with expectations, Designated Sponsors contribute more to the 
liquidity in the larger order sizes (i.e. volume classes).
The study did not confirm that Designated Sponsors are attracted to more 
liquid stocks, at least in our sample of TecDAX. Nevertheless, we believe that 
such a result is consistent with the Designated Sponsor model run on Xetra. It 
is because Designated Sponsors enter a stock for the variety of other reasons 
than just liquidity.
1.4  Essay 3: Research Question and Main Findings
The aim of the third essay “How Do Trading Costs Vary Across the Day? A 
note on the innovative XLM measure for Small Caps at the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange“ is to investigate the intraday pattern of trading costs for small cap 
stocks in the electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
5We analyse the XLM variable, which is a more comprehensive liquidity 
measure than the bid-ask spread or trading volume. Unlike previous studies, 
we focus on 28 less liquid technology stocks in the TecDAX index during the 
current Xetra opening hours. We use a sample of minute-based trading data 
for selection of stocks between 25 May 2006 and 23 June 2006. 
We find a reverse J-shaped intraday profile of XLM, implying that liquidity is 
lowest immediately after the start of trading and highest in the early afternoon. 
This time of lowest execution costs and thus highest trading quality coincides 
with the opening of the NYSE. Order book imbalances, and thus execution 
possibilities, confirm this pattern. Imbalances are highest early in the morning, 
rendering execution possibilities worst compared to the remainder of the 
trading day. Order book imbalances are lowest at U.S. pre-opening, and 
execution possibilities in Xetra are best once the NYSE has started trading.
Based on these empirical results, it is most advantageous for liquidity traders 
to place their orders in the early afternoon, while trading in the first half hour of 
opening is not recommended. Similarly, trading should not be left until the last 
half opening hour of Xetra. For informed trades, however, higher trading costs 
in the early morning could be offset by the profits from superior information. 
This might be an avenue for further research.
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72  Overview of Academic Literature on Liquidity
2.1 The Importance of Liquidity 
One of the most important criteria for the evaluation of capital markets and 
market places for securities’ trading is liquidity. High liquidity means the ability 
to trade, buy and sell securities without impact and movement in the share 
price. It is important to understand secondary-market liquidity because of the 
various roles it plays in the capital markets. Liquidity encourages trading by 
reducing transaction costs. A market participant’s ability to capture potential 
gains of trade depends directly on liquidity levels. For investors, in order to 
maximize the net return on an investment in securities, it is important to be 
able   to   execute   their buy  and   sell   transactions  at  the   lowest   possible 
transaction costs. The anticipated transaction costs should be included as a 
decision-making criterion when deciding on a specific investment, i.e. stock 
picking, so that securities can be compared and/or benchmarked in terms of 
the anticipated net return.
In the framework of portfolio restructuring, liquidity is by far the most important 
decision-making criterion for investors (Schiereck (1995)) and is regarded as 
the central quality characteristic in securities markets. At the macro-level, 
liquid capital markets are essential for the efficiency of capital allocation in 
modern economies and lead to low cost of capital for issuers. There is an 
economic   welfare   benefit   from   liquid   markets   because   trading   is   the 
mechanism   through   which   information   is   introduced   into   prices.   More 
informative prices lead to more efficient allocation of capital across competing 
investments (Wurgler (2000)).   At the micro-level, a liquid market enables 
access to a large number of trading interests and thus ensures that investors 
can carry out their transactions at any time.
Liquidity also plays a significant role in determining the firm’s cost of capital. 
The more liquid the firm’s stock is, the lower the illiquidity premium in 
expected stock returns will be and this will lead to a lower costs of capital for 
the   firm   and   eventually   a   higher   market   capitalisation.   (Amihud   and 
Mendelson (1986) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002)). 
8For all of these reasons, there is considerable interest among managers, 
investors, exchange members, exchanges and regulators in understanding 
the   determinants   of   secondary-market   liquidity.   Stock   exchanges   are 
especially interested in the nature of liquidity and focus on the choice and 
optimisation of market models and market segments to try to improve the 
liquidity. 
However, there is neither a uniform agreement of the term liquidity, nor a 
common operational model for the analysis of liquidity and transaction costs 
neither in the practical world, nor in the academic literature (Oesterhelweg 
and Schiereck (1993)). The lack of unified criteria and approach is further 
complicated by the fact that the nature and patterns of liquidity are strongly 
influenced and often shaped by a variety of factors like market structure, 
trading rules, continuous trading versus firm quotes, the level and efficiency of 
market supervision, insider trading, order sizes and many more. These factors 
affect trading patterns of market participants, thus affecting the liquidity (Stoll 
(1992), Grossman and Miller (1988)).
In traditional specialist markets, traders typically only saw the buy and sell 
prices that market maker quotes for a stock. Larger trades often involved a 
different trading mechanism so-called “upstairs market”. In these dealer 
markets, the spread might be an adequate description of a stock liquidity. 
In modern automated auction markets, the liquidity supply solely depends on 
the state of the electronic order book, which consists of previously entered, 
non-executed buy and sell limit-orders. This set of standing orders determines 
the   price-volume   relationship   that   a   trader   who   requires   immediacy   of 
execution is facing. If few limit buy or sell orders are present in the system or 
if many orders are present but for small trade sizes only, liquidity is low and 
marketable limit order trades may incur considerable price impacts. If an order 
is very large, it hits unexecuted limit orders, which have different price limits. 
The larger the order, the more price limits will be hit and the further a market 
order walks up the limit order book. Evidently, the spread and depth at best 
prices alone are not sufficient to characterize the liquidity of a limit order book 
market.
92.2 Liquidity Definitions and Dimensions
In the literature, the notion of liquidity is generally conceived as the ability to 
trade quickly a large volume with minimal price impact or low transaction 
costs. This definition can be found in Harris (1990), Bernstein (1987) and 
Schwartz   (1988).  This definition   includes  three   elements:  volume,  price 
continuity and time. These definition elements can be operationalised through 
liquidity dimensions as discussed in Oesterhelweg and Schiereck (1993). 
Although the term liquidity is common in the research and practice, there is 
still no agreement on its measurement.
Going   back   to   earlier   works   on   liquidity,   Kyle   (1985)   identified  three 
dimensions of liquidity:
· Tightness or width (reflected in the bid-ask spread): The possibility to 
buy and sell the same instrument at almost the same price.
· Market depth (reflects in volume): Ability to trade a large amount 
without influencing the price (takes into account only the volumes at 
the best bid and ask prices). 
· Market   resiliency   or   elasticity:   the   speed   of   liquidity   return   to 
equilibrium or “normal levels” after an adverse liquidity shock (defined 
in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005)). Alternatively, a market is said 
to be resilient when prices quickly return to “normal” after a shock 
(Black (1971), Harris (1990)).
Tightness addresses the question of transaction costs and is hence closely 
related to the bid/ask spread. Market depth and resiliency on the other hand 
attempt to identify the size that is tradable with no or only a minimal influence 
on the quoted price. 
Also in Bernstein (1987) and Garbade (1982), only the three above-mentioned 
dimensions of liquidity are considered. However, all these definitions of 
liquidity automatically assume that immediacy is not a dimension as such.
Later, Harris (1990) adds the forth dimension of liquidity being immediacy. He 
mentioned:   width   (equivalent   to   tightness   in   other   definitions),   depth, 
resilience   and   immediacy.   The   term   liquidity   is   also   described   in   four 
10dimensions: market breadth, market depth, immediacy in execution and the 
market resiliency by Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) or Roll (1984). 
All   these   liquidity   measures   are   interdependent.   Width   and   depth   are 
interlinked. Width (defined through bid-ask spread) is an increasing function of 
order size (Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993)). Both these dimensions depend 
on immediacy since it is possible to realize a different price for a given volume 
later. Immediacy is also only given if the market is resilient.
We can classify different liquidity measures available in the literature by a) 
calculation based on order book data or transaction data, referring to ex-ante 
or ex-post measures and b) the number of liquidity dimensions they cover. For 
a comparative analysis of various liquidity measures, see Brunner (1996).
When   assessing   liquidity,   approximation   factors   or   so-called   liquidity 
indicators or ratios oriented towards transaction data are used. Ratios such as 
transaction volume (defined as value of a transaction) or a unit volume 
(defined as number of instrument units) or a transaction frequency (defined as 
a number of transactions executed within a certain time) and the relative 
transaction volume (defined as a ratio of transaction volume to free float of the 
respective security) are applied (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2002)). Another ex-post measurement (developed by 
Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985)) is “Amivest Liquidity ratio” which calculates 
the average trading volume needed to produce a 1% price change. It is 
defined by the ratio of average traded volume and average relative price 
change in the given time interval.
All these ratios are oriented to the past and they reflect the recent activity, but 
not necessarily the present liquidity in a given instrument. These transaction 
oriented figures risk being significantly distorted by a small number of very 
large or very small transactions. Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen (2004) 
provided evidence of a discretionary trading in Xetra. The study found that the 
large orders are timed and take place when liquidity is highest. The evidence 
of strategic order placement in the Swedish futures market was also reported 
(Coppejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2004)). Therefore, transaction based 
measures ignore the fact that trades might only take place because of the 
11provided level of ex-ante liquidity, thus possibly overestimating liquidity in the 
instrument.
Marsh and Rock (1996), Oesterhelweg and Schiereck (1993) and others 
consider that the liquidity ratios do not directly operationalize any liquidity 
dimension. Thus, we believe that ex-ante measures of liquidity based on order 
book data should be preferred to the ex-post measures based on transactions 
data.
The   most   widespread   measure   for   the   price   is   the   quoted   spread 
(corresponding to width) and for the quantity - the depth of the best bid and 
the best ask quote. Although the spread measures only one dimension of 
liquidity, it has been widely used as a way to measure and compare liquidity. 
For example, Demsetz (1968), Brockman and Chung (1998), Chordia, Rol 
and Subrahmanyam (2000) all measure liquidity by looking at quotes and 
quantities at best prices. This can be partially explained by the fact that the 
data on spreads and best bid and best ask prices is widely available but the 
data on the full order book or a data beyond best bid and ask was difficult to 
obtain in the past.
Of course, when looking at more general measures of liquidity, the analysis 
cannot be limited to the best bid/ask prices and quantities; rather it must 
extend to the whole order book. Due to the strong interactions of different 
dimensions of liquidity, all dimensions should be measured jointly to provide 
the full picture of liquidity.
A common measure in the computation of order book liquidity is the quote 
slope, defined as the bid and ask spread divided by the (logarithm) of the 
product of the respective quantities: Here, Pask (Pbid ) is the ask (bid) price and 
qask and qbid are the corresponding quantities. The quote slope is therefore a 
measure of liquidity that combines both price and quantity information and 
relies on Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001). The lower is the quote slope; the more 
liquid is the market. This can be either due to a decrease in the difference 
between the bid price and the ask price or due to the fact that a larger quantity 
has appeared in the market. Numerically this can be formulated as follows:
12100 x  
Pask-Pbid
log (qask x qbid)
100 x  
Pask-Pbid
log (qask x qbid)
In the case of a market model based on the limit order book, the limit orders in 
the order book can be used to calculate the weighted average price for each 
executable size. The computation is done for simultaneous buy and sell 
orders of the same size at the same time, thus computing liquidity from the 
point of view of a market order trader. The result of such measure is called 
Cost Of Round Trip, CRT (D), where D indicates the order size. It was 
developed   by  Irvine,  Benson   and   Kandel   (2000).  Similar measure   was 
constructed   by  Barclay   et   al.   (1999)   for   Nasdaq   dealer   market.   Other 
researchers   implemented   similar   measures   (Coppejans,   Domowitz   and 
Madhavan (2004);  Domowitz and Wang (2002)).
The Cost of Round Trip model for measuring the liquidity is starting to look at 
the costs of opening and closing the positions. It leads in our view to the more 
objective figure for the measurement of liquidity, which should be derived from 
its direct benefit for the market participants. The direct benefit of liquid 
markets for the investor derives from the minimization of performance loss 
resulting from opening and closing a position (round trip). The lower these 
costs are, the higher the liquidity of the respective security or of a market as 
such.
2.3 Implicit Transaction Costs and Market Impact
Gomber and Schweickert (2002) have adapted Irvine, Benson and Kandel 
(2000) formula of CRT and proposed Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM). In 
July 2002 Deutsche Börse AG implemented the XLM measure in Xetra. XLM 
calculates the cost of liquidity based on the market impact concept. XLM 
represents an integrative view on liquidity as liquidity is measured through 
width, depth and immediacy and implicit transaction costs are measured as 
market impact.
There is a vast literature on trading costs and their determinants; see for 
example Keim and Madhavan (1998). Usually, the literature distinguishes 
13explicit and implicit trading costs. The explicit part consists of fixed costs, such 
as commissions, taxes, and fees and incurred with the order processing and 
settlement by brokers, banks and exchanges. Implicit costs are built up of 
market impact costs (price impact), bid-ask spread, delay or timing costs (the 
costs of adverse price movements that may occur when trading is postponed), 
and opportunity costs (the costs of not trading or the lost profit due to the fact 
that the order in its full or its parts is not filled), see Figure 2.1 (adopted from 
Gomber and Schweickert).
Figure 2.1: Concept of Transaction Costs 
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Market impact costs are generally found to be the most important component 
of trading costs and occur when price effects cause execution prices to be 
less favourable than benchmark prices. 
Keim and Madhavan (1997) investigate the total execution costs (defined as 
the sum of commission and market impact costs) of institutional trades in 
relation to investment styles, using data on the equity transactions of 21 
institutions during the 1991−1993 period. The authors find that the magnitude 
14of the average total execution costs varies between 49 basis points
1 (bp) and 
123 bp for buys and between 55 bp and 143 bp for sells. Out of this 
commissions, on average, contribute about 40% to total execution costs, the 
rest being attributed to the implicit transaction costs.
The Market Impact measures the costs of the immediate demand for liquidity. 
The Market Impact as a liquidity measure methodologically covers three of the 
four liquidity dimensions. The fourth dimension, time, is assessed through the 
change in measurement results over the course of time.
2.4 Components of Transaction Costs and Construction of XLM
As can be seen in the Figure 2.1, width as a first of the dimensions of liquidity 
is described through Liquidity Premium (LP) and it equals half bid-ask spread. 
The depth, as a second dimension of liquidity is described here thought the 
calculation of adverse price movement (APM). APM is defined as a price 
effect by the demand of immediacy if order size is bigger than the best bid-ask 
size. The third dimension of liquidity – immediacy – is covered by the 
methodology of market impact costs though the assumption that it calculates 
the immediate demand for liquidity at certain time.
Figure 2.2 explains the calculation of XLM. The explanation of XLM is adopted 
from Gomber and Schweickert (2002). Market impact consists of the sum of 
the liquidity premium (LP) and the adverse price movement (APM). 
Liquidity premium (LP) is calculated as a half of the bid-ask spread and it is 
measured from the difference between the middle of the bid-ask spread 
(midpoint B) and the current best ask limit (point C) for a buy order (B-to-C) or 
the current best bid limit (point A) for a sell order (A-to-B). The midpoint of the 
spread serves as a proxy and the reference for the theoretical market value of 
the instrument.
The liquidity premium, however, does not measure the price effect if the order 
size is larger than the best bid-ask price. It represents the market width but 
not the depth.   Larger orders in the limit order book are usually executed 
against  several limits, and with every additional execution, the average 
1  100 basis points equal 1%.
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execution price for the order deteriorates. The market depth is then measured 
through adverse price movement (APM). The trading costs for the investor 
then increase additionally by the difference between the respective best bid or 
ask quote and the resulting average execution price (C-to-D for a buy order 
and/or A-to-D for a sell order). Both liquidity premium (LP) and adverse price 
movement (APM) are calculated for each side of the order book. The sum of 
the market impact on both sides of the order book represents the costs of 
round trip for a certain size.
Figure 2.2: Exchange Liquidity Measure Concept
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Constructing XLM starts with the weighted average price P at which an order 
of a given size V can be settled immediately, separately for buys (B) and sells 
(S). The execution cost, denoted in basis points is then
  and 
for buys and sells, respectively, with M  t being the quote midpoint at time t. 
Adding these up yields the cost of the roundtrip transaction.  















16In practice, in order to capture market impact costs in the Xetra order book, a 
hypothetical unlimited buy-and-sell order is entered into the order book. The 
result, the average execution price, is compared to the theoretical market 
value (average between best-buy and best-sell limit): smaller difference leads 
to lower XLM (i.e. the cost for the investor). Lower XLM indicates higher 
liquidity of a security.
The  XLM   is   stated   in   basis  points   (100   basis   points  =   1   percent).   It 
corresponds to the relative market impact costs for the so-called round trip 
(simultaneous buying and selling of a position) for a given order size. An XLM 
of ten basis points and an order volume of 25,000 EUR means, for instance, 
that the market impact costs for buying and selling this share have amounted 
to 25 EUR. 
XLM is measured every minute during the trading day for hypothetical 
execution possibilities of different pre-defined order sizes of 10,000 EUR, 
25,000 EUR, etc. Often, the order book situation is such that the execution of 
full hypothetical order is not possible. Partial execution possibilities are not 
taken into consideration.  In such case, the measurement is simply ignored 
and left blank. However, the statistics are available on the percent-basis of 
minutes per trading day at which the measurement was possible - and at 
which not possible. For example, 80% would mean that only on 80% of 
trading minutes the hypothetical execution was available for measurement. 
On the remaining 20% - volume in the order book was not sufficient for the 
execution.
There are two types of XLM that are measured by Deutsche Börse – natural 
and total liquidity. This concept comes from the existence of Designated 
Sponsors (market makers) in Xetra order book. Natural liquidity measures the 
XLM for order book activity without Designated Sponsor quotes or trades. 
Total   liquidity   combines   natural   liquidity   with   the   liquidity   injected   by 
Designated Sponsors. 
172.5 Screen-based Stock Trading in Germany via Xetra
The German stock market when measured by its liquidity ranks comparatively 
well against other European or international markets. For example, Jain 
(2003) showed that Germany’s transaction costs are lower than in the UK. 
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) compared implicit transaction costs of 
42 exchanges worldwide in the period 1996-1998 and found that European 
exchanges reveal a stronger decrease in transaction costs than the US 
exchanges and attributed it to the faster adoption of technology. In contrast, a 
study by Pagano and Padilla (2005) revealed that implicit transaction costs in 
Germany   are   on   the   higher   end   compared   to   other   major   European 
exchanges. 
The German stock market is fragmented between seven German stock 
exchanges
2. Frankfurt Stock Exchange FSE, which is operated by Deutsche 
Börse AG, operates both the electronic trading platform Xetra and the floor-
based trading. This work is based on Xetra, the most liquid market for 
German stocks
3. Xetra is an anonymous electronic limit order book.
In equities trading, Xetra plays a dominant role with a market share of 90.1%
4. 
It is especially high in the stocks belonging to the German blue chip index 
DAX30, in which it is reaching 97.4%. In December 2007, the share of DAX 
trading accounted to 82% of the total order book turnover in equities across all 
German exchanges. For trading on Xetra, DAX equities represented 83%. 
TecDAX equities represented 3% of the total equities order book turnover on 
Xetra.
The index
5 family of Deutsche Börse AG consists of DAX, the German blue 
chip index of 30 most liquid and most traded companies listed on the FSE, the 
2 Alphabetically – Berlin-Bremen, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover,  Munich, 
Stuttgart
3 Besides Xetra, in Germany there are the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (organized in a way 
similar to the NYSE) and several regional exchanges. 
4 See Deutsche Börse AG cash market statistics available online under www.deutsche-
boerse.com in the section Info-centre/Statistics/Cash market/ Monthly Statistics Cash market, 
December 2007
5  For more details on indexes and their compositions, see Deutsche Borse AG “Guide to 
Equity indices” available online
18TecDAX
6  that tracks 30 largest and most liquid companies from various 
technology related sectors, the MDAX with other 50 midcap stocks and SDAX 
that combines the next 50 liquid stocks.
Xetra divides stock trading into different trading models depending on the 
liquidity of an instrument. Instruments are either traded in:
a) auction-only, implying very low liquidity, or 
b) in the continuous trading with auctions and liquidity providers called 
Designated Sponsors or 
c) continuously without any support of liquidity providers. 
Two criteria are used to define the trading model for the security:
i) average liquidity, measured by XLM with the reference order size of 
25,000 EUR and 
ii) order book turnover of the security (as average daily trading volume). 
Based   on   these   two   criteria,   Deutsche   Börse   will   separate   all   stocks 
continuously traded on Xetra into two liquidity categories, A and B, see Figure 
2.3. Securities in liquidity category A will not require a Designated Sponsor for 
continuous trading as they are deemed to have sufficient liquidity. Category A 
includes all equities with XLM measure being 100 basis points or less (1 basis 
point = 0.01 percent) and an average daily order book turnover of at least 2.5 
million EUR. 
Securities with an XLM of more than 100 basis points and/or an average daily 
order book turnover of less than EUR 2.5 million belong to liquidity category 
B. Here, at least one Designated Sponsor is needed for continuous trading in 
Xetra. The Figure below is adopted from Deutsche Börse AG publication 
“Stock&Standarts”, No 2/2002.
The market model for stock trading on Xetra can be described as order-
driven. The liquidity is provided by limit orders and by Designated Sponsor 
quotes. Besides normal limit orders, market participants may submit market 
orders and hidden orders ("iceberg orders"). These orders have a visible part, 
6 TecDAX was introduced in March 2003 as a successor to the ill-fated index NEMAX50
19which is displayed on the trading screens and an invisible part. When the 
visible part is executed, it is replaced by a portion of the hidden part that is 
equal in size to the original visible part. This procedure is repeated until the 
hidden part is exhausted. 
Figure 2.3: Liquidity Categories on Xetra
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The general task of Designated Sponsors is to offer binding prices for bid- and 
ask side (quotes) for the appointed shares in continuous trading and auctions. 
In principle, several Designated Sponsors can support one stock, and equally 
a stock can have several Designated Sponsors acting in it. As a benefit for 
Designated   Sponsor,   Deutsche   Börse   waves   the   fees   for   trades   on 
Designated Sponsor account. Designated Sponsors offer listed companies 
additional services like research reports, preparation of analyst presentations 
or active distribution of shares. Such services are possibly pay-for services by 
the issuers but the exchange does not regulate or intervene in this part of the 
relationship between Designated Sponsor (DS) and the issuer. Designated 
Sponsors’ quoting must satisfy certain quality criteria (minimum requirements) 
20stipulated by Deutsche Börse AG with respect to the trading characteristics of 
the respective share and include for example minimum quote size, maximum 
spread, response time and participation time.
Trading on Xetra starts at 9 am with an opening call auction and (during our 
sample period) ends at 17.30 pm with a closing auction. There is one intraday 
call auctions at 1 pm.  Figure 2.4 is adopted from the website of Deutsche 
Börse AG
7.
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The instrument tick size, the minimum increment by which prices can move, 
representing the smallest variation of price setting for limit orders, is defined at 
Euro 0.01.
Xetra offers extensive pre- and post-trade transparency for all prices and 
orders in the order book (pre-trade) and all transactions with volume and price 
(post-trade) are immediately distributed to the members. Nevertheless, Xetra 
is an anonymous order book and identities of traders for both orders and 
trades are not shown. It is interesting to note that as Hachmeister and 
Schiereck (2010) showed the implementation of post-trade transparency rules 
on Xetra in 2003 led to significant increase in liquidity. Pre-trade transparency 




21Xetra   market   model   contains   additional   safeguards   in   auctions   and   in 
continuous   trading   to   improve   price   continuity   and   increase   execution 
probability of market orders as follows: a) volatility interruptions that are 
triggered if the potential execution price lies outside a defined static or 
dynamic price corridor around reference price which is the last traded price 
and b) market order interruptions which are not frequent and implemented for 
auctions.
In the next Chapters we will present the three essays that address selected 
issues in the stock market liquidity. All three essays conduct original empirical 
research using data from the German Xetra trading system and the set of 
stocks that belong to German TecDAX index.  
The first essay (Chapter 3) focuses on the weather effects on the stock 
market liquidity. The second essay (Chapter 4) focuses on the issue of market 
makers’ effect on liquidity and investigates the role of Designated Sponsors in 
the Xetra electronic order book and. Finally, the third essay (Chapter 5) 
investigates the intraday effect on liquidity.   
223 Does Screen Trading Weather the Weather? A Note on 
Cloudy Skies, Liquidity and Computerized Stock Markets
8
Abstract
This paper tests for the presence of a weather effect on liquidity in a screen-
based electronic stock market. The use of the Exchange Liquidity Measure 
XLM enables us to separate the effect of cloudy skies on liquidity provided by 
market makers from this effect on liquidity naturally in the market. 
The empirical evidence suggests that cloudy skies correspond with high 
natural liquidity levels and low liquidity injected by market makers. This result 
is   consistent   with   findings   for   floor-based   stock   trading   and   with   the 
hypothesis that market makers add less value in markets with high natural 
liquidity.
8 The earlier version of this paper is accepted for publication in the Journal of Trading, co-
authored by Christiane Goodfellow and Dirk Schiereck. 
233.1 Introduction
The weather effect refers to the positive correlation between sunshine and 
stock returns. This phenomenon was first documented by Saunders (1993), 
followed by mixed empirical evidence on its presence. More recently, the 
literature has been focusing on different groups of market participants driving 
the weather effect. Both Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) and Flemisch et al. 
(2009) attribute the weather effect to market maker actions. This paper 
contributes to this ongoing debate by investigating the effect of the weather 
conditions in Frankfurt, Germany, on stock market liquidity in the electronic 
trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE). The choice of a 
particular liquidity variable, which only this market provides officially, enables 
us to explicitly test for weather effects on the liquidity provided by market 
makers.
Research in psychology shows that sunlight influences people’s moods, 
sentiments, and judgements. Specifically, lack of sunlight is associated with 
depression (Eagles (1994)). Likewise, sunshine induces optimism, which 
results in market participants incorrectly attributing their upbeat mood to a 
positive economic outlook rather than to the weather. Furthermore, individuals 
in a positive mood are less likely to engage in critical analyses of economic 
factors than people in a depressed state of mind. The combination of a 
favorable perception of the economic outlook and a lack of doubts on this 
leads to less risk-averse market participants than on overcast days.
The empirical evidence on the presence of a weather effect is mixed.
9 Both 
Saunders (1993) and Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) report evidence in 
favor of a weather effect. Specifically, Saunders (1993) finds New York City 
sunshine to statistically significantly raise daily stock market returns from 1927 
to 1989. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) provide international evidence from 
1982 to 1997 and confirm, overall, a statistically significant negative relation 
between cloud cover and stock return. For New York City, for example, 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) report an annualized nominal return of 9% 
9 A related strand of literature investigates seasonal stock market anomalies (e.g. Kamstra et 
al. (2003)). This is not discussed further as this paper focuses on daily weather effects on 
liquidity.
24per year for cloudy days while the respective return for sunny days amounts 
to 25%. The weather effect is, therefore, economically significant. For data 
availability reasons, the German stock market is excluded from Shumway’s 
(2003) dataset.
By contrast, Trombley (1997) and Loughran and Schultz (2004) present 
evidence against the weather effect. Trombley (1997) examines the 1927 to 
1992 period in New York City and finds that the choice of days for which to 
compare returns determines the statistical significance of the results in 
Saunders (1993), who compares average returns on completely cloudy days 
with average returns on 0% to 20% cloudy days. When Trombley (1997) 
contrasts returns on 0% cloudy days with returns on 100% cloudy days, the 
weather effect disappears, although intuitively it should be strongest in this 
setting.
Moreover, investors whose orders drive asset prices submit these orders from 
all over the world and are hence unlikely to be affected by the local weather at 
the stock exchange. Loughran and Schultz (2004) therefore test for the 
influence of the local weather at the firms’ headquarters on the return of their 
stocks which are traded at the Nasdaq system in New York City from 1988 to 
1997. Remarkably, local weather appears to have no effect on stock returns, 
even though trading volume is predominantly originated by local investors 
(Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)).
Against the background of this debate on the existence and origin of the 
weather effect, Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) investigate the influence of 
weather on individual investors’ trading activities at five major U.S. stock 
exchanges from 1991 to 1996. They find evidence in favor of a weather effect, 
but   this   cannot   be   attributed   to   individual   investors’   trading   activities. 
Assuming that institutional investors are less sentiment-driven and mood-
dependent in their trading strategies than individuals (Barber and Odean 
(2009), Cohen et al. (2002)), there is only one group of market participants left 
that could be causing the weather effect: market makers. This is plausible as 
market makers are physically at the exchange and are hence more subject to 
local weather than investors who could be elsewhere.
25In order to test for weather effects on market makers’ behaviour, Goetzmann 
and Zhu (2005) examine the bid-ask spread. In fact, cloud cover and bid-ask 
spreads are found to be positively correlated, which is explained by more risk-
averse market makers in cloudy weather than in sunshine (Gehrig and 
Jackson (1998)). More importantly, the weather effect on stock returns is 
much reduced when the weather impact on spreads is controlled for, and the 
weather effect on stock returns appears to be partially driven by weather-
induced changes in liquidity.
For the German electronic trading system Xetra, however, Flemisch et al. 
(2009) report narrower spreads in cloudy weather than with sunshine. They 
argue that leisure activities are less attractive to market makers in cloudy 
weather than with clear skies. As a result, market makers work harder by 
providing additional liquidity when the alternative, i.e. leisure, is valued less 
highly.
In essence, there is an ongoing debate about the existence of a weather 
effect on stock returns, and about the direction of the established correlation 
between cloudy skies and liquidity. We contribute to this by testing for a 
potential influence of the weather in Frankfurt (Main) on liquidity provided by 
market makers in the electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock 
exchange. Rather than using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, we 
apply the exchange liquidity measure (XLM) introduced by Gomber et al. 
(2005). The construction of this variable enables us to distinguish between the 
weather effect on liquidity provided by the market maker, and its influence on 
the level  of liquidity present in the market without the market maker’s 
activities, i.e. natural liquidity.
Specifically, we raise four research questions. First, we analyze the relation 
between weather and natural liquidity. In light of Flemisch et al. (2009), we 
hypothesize that transaction costs are lower on overcast days than on clear 
days. Second, we examine the effect of weather on liquidity injected by 
market makers. We expect that market makers’ contribution to liquidity is 
higher on overcast days than in sunshine. Third, we investigate the influence 
on liquidity of multiple market makers acting in one stock. In light of Bosch 
(2001), who reports a significantly positive correlation between the liquidity in 
26a stock and the number of market makers acting in it, we assume that injected 
liquidity rises with the number of market makers. Finally, we study the relation 
between trading volume in a particular stock and injected liquidity. If trading 
volume and injected liquidity are negatively correlated, market makers add 
less value in liquid stocks.
In order to investigate a potential Frankfurt German stock exchange, section 
3.2 provides some institutional details of this trading platform, before section 
3.3 introduces the methodology and our dataset. Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical results, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Screen-based Stock Trading in Germany via Xetra
Xetra is the fully electronic screen-based trading platform run by the German 
Stock Exchange, Deutsche Boerse AG, and organized as an anonymous 
open limit order book.
10  It started to operate in November 1997 and is 
currently open daily from 9.00am to 5.30pm. Continuous trading is interrupted 
by an opening, an intraday and one closing auction, which concentrate 
liquidity. Financial institutions, securities trading houses and brokers can 
participate in Xetra trading independently of their location. Trading in Xetra is 
anonymous, with a central counterparty (CCP) clearing the offsetting orders.
11 
On busy days, more than 2 million trades per day are executed in Xetra.
Tradable instruments are primarily equities, certificates, warrants, exchange-
traded funds, and subscription rights. Equities can be traded in all order sizes 
in Xetra, and orders are executed according to price-time priority.  The 
German stock exchange groups many of these together in indices. The most 
prominent equity index is the German blue-chip index DAX, comprising the 30 
stocks with the largest market capitalization.
This study focuses on TecDAX stocks, the 30 largest technology stocks that 
are not included in the DAX. In our sample period, 3% of total equities 
turnover was originated by TecDAX equities. The limited liquidity levels and 
10 The information in this section is based on Deutsche Boerse’s website, http://deutsche-
boerse.com, unless stated otherwise.
11  See Grammig et al. (2001) and Hachmeister and Schiereck (2010) for effects of anonymity 
27significant market making activities in these stocks provide an ideal testing 
ground for our research questions.
Market Maker activities are provided by so-called ‘Designated Sponsors’ who 
offer additional liquidity and transaction opportunities, especially in less liquid 
stocks, by offering binding quotes for both buys and sells. These quotes are 
required to have a certain maximum bid-ask spread and a certain minimum 
quote size. Banks and securities firms act as Designated Sponsors. In 
principle, several Designated Sponsors can support one stock, and equally a 
stock can have several Designated Sponsors acting in it. Less liquid stocks 
can only be traded continuously if they have been adopted by at least one 
Designated Sponsor. 
Transaction fees are only charged for executed orders. These fees amount to 
0.48 basis points, a minimum of 0.60 Euros and a maximum of 18.00 Euros 
per   order.   Discounts   are   available   for   computer-generated   orders,   i.e. 
algorithmic trading. Xetra’s function XetraBest ensures full and immediate 
execution for private investors’ orders at a price that is automatically better 
than the order book, and fixed clearing fees are waived.
3.3 Methodology and Data
An examination of the weather effect on liquidity requires two variables, one 
measuring liquidity and one capturing sunshine. As the former, we focus on 
the Exchange Liquidity Measure XLM (Gomber et al. (2005)), which measures 
the cost of a roundtrip trade dependently on order size. The German Stock 
Exchange has been calculating XLM based on all information in the order 
book, i.e. including the hidden part of iceberg orders, for all stocks traded 
continuously in Xetra since July 2002. XLM therefore provides a more 
comprehensive analysis of liquidity costs than the bid-ask spread.
Constructing XLM starts with the weighted average price P at which an order 
of a given size V can be settled immediately, separately for buys (B) and sells 
(S). The execution cost, denoted in basis points
12, is then
12 100 basis points equal 1%.
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for buys and sells, respectively, with  t M  being the quote midpoint at time t. 
Adding   these   up   yields   the   cost   of   the   roundtrip   transaction 
) ( ) ( ) ( , , V XLM V XLM V XLM t S t B t + = . The higher are the transaction costs, the 
higher is XLM, and the lower is the liquidity.
This liquidity variable XLM comes in two flavours. Natural XLM measures the 
liquidity in the market without that provided by market makers. Total XLM, by 
contrast, includes that part of liquidity that is injected into the order book by 
market makers. Thus, this choice of liquidity variable enables us to test 
directly for the effect of weather on liquidity injected by market makers. 
Because XLM captures transaction costs and these are inversely related to 
liquidity, total XLM is smaller than natural XLM. In other words, the presence 
of market makers reduces execution costs. The XLM data are based on 
hypothetical order sizes of 10,000 EUR, 25,000 EUR, and 50,000 EUR, which 
are included in our regression analyses as volume classes. 
Trading volume is the average daily traded volume per stock in millions of 
Euros. As for the weather variable, we follow Saunders (1993), Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003), and Flemisch et al. (2009) and use sky coverage at the 
headquarters of the German stock exchange in Frankfurt. In order to quantify 
the weather effect on liquidity, we follow Flemisch et al. (2009) and estimate a 
fixed effects panel regression model with the basic specification 
t i t i t i t i e TradgVolum SkyCover s VolumeClas XLM , , 3 2 1 , e b b b a + + + + =
With this panel approach, we analyze the observations on individual stocks i 
over time t, and the statistical inference hinges on these individual stocks. For 
the first research question, we use natural liquidity as the dependent variable. 
By contrast, in order to address the second question, total liquidity is used, 
which includes that injected by Designated Sponsors. Turning to the third 
research question, the number of Designated Sponsors is introduced as an 
additional independent variable.
29Deutsche Boerse AG provided daily XLM and trading volume data for all 
TecDAX stocks for the two-year period from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 
2005. We include in our sample 16 stocks that belonged to TecDAX for at 
least two consecutive months in our sample period and for which at least one 
Designated Sponsor was acting. These stocks are all domestic, including 
QIAGEN NV that was established in Germany but included in the TecDAX 
and listed on Xetra under a Dutch ISIN. This selection results in a dataset with 
24,666 observations for each of the parameters of trading volume, natural and 
total liquidity. Each Designated Sponsor is located in Frankfurt.
Sky   coverage   data   are   available   from   the   German   Weather   Service 
(Deutscher Wetterdienst) online (www.dwd.de). These data measure the daily 
mean sky coverage, calculated across the hours of the day. This average is 
presented in 9 classes, with zero referring to cloudless skies and 8 meaning 
fully overcast. Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests suggest that this weather 
variable is stationary.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on our dataset.
30Table 3.1: Summary Statistics On Cloudy Sky and Liquidity
XLM natural in 
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Daily trading volume is denominated in millions of Euros. The mean XLM is 
calculated for all three volume classes of 10,000 EUR, 25,000 EUR, and 
50,000 EUR.
313.4 Empirical Results
The primary goal of this paper is to determine weather effects on liquidity in 
the electronic trading system Xetra. The choice of the XLM measure for 
liquidity enables us to test directly for the influence of sky coverage on liquidity 
injected by market makers. From this, we can draw conclusions regarding the 
extent to which moods and sentiments drive liquidity in Xetra. Table 3.1 
presents the empirical results.
First, we test for the weather effect on natural liquidity. This is the level of 
liquidity in  the  market without  any contribution by market makers. The 
estimated coefficient on sky coverage is highly significant and negative and 
robust towards the inclusion of trading volume as a control variable. Thus, the 
cloudier the sky over Frankfurt is, the lower the XLM measure will be. This 
means lower transaction costs and higher natural liquidity. This finding refers 
to overall liquidity in the market and therefore does not permit any conclusions 
specifically about market makers. This empirical result is at odds with the 
findings of Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) for the U.S. but consistent with 
Flemisch at al. (2009) for the German market, whose sample period overlaps 
with ours.
Second, we analyze the relation between sky coverage and liquidity injected 
by market makers. Again, this relation is statistically significant and negative 
implying that the more overcast the sky, the lower the liquidity contribution by 
market makers. Controlling for trading volume does not change this finding, 
which can be viewed as evidence supporting Goetzmann and Zhu (2005). 
Cloudier weather renders market makers more risk averse, thus providing 
less liquidity than on sunny days. Alternatively, it can be argued that overall 
liquidity is higher on cloudy days than in sunshine, thus market makers add 
less value in an already rather liquid market. This finding complements the 
results presented in Flemisch et al. (2009) in that it addresses directly the 
weather effect on Designated Sponsors.
Third, we investigate if more Designated Sponsors providing transaction 
services for a particular stock reduce execution costs more strongly than 
fewer Designated Sponsors would. The estimated coefficient on the number 
32of Designated Sponsors is statistically significant and positive. Hence, the 
larger the number of Designated Sponsors, the larger is the injected XLM. 
This result is in line with our hypothesis that market makers have a favorable 
effect on liquidity.
Fourth, we examine the relation between trading volume and injected liquidity. 
This relation is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that the more 
liquid a stock, the less value Designated Sponsors add in providing liquidity.
Table 3.2:  Weather Effect on Liquidity in Xetra: Fixed Effects Panel 
Regression
Daily trading volume is denominated in millions of Euros. Standard errors are given in 
brackets. Columns (1) and (2) address the weather effect on natural liquidity, with 
column (2) including trading volume as a control variable. Columns (3) and (4) 
analyze the weather effect on the total liquidity on the market (i.e. including the 
contribution of Designated Sponsors (DS)), with column (4) including trading volume 
as a control variable. Furthermore, column (5) presents the relationship between the 
number of Designated Sponsors and injected liquidity. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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2 0.520 0.522 0.640 0.641 .232
F-statistics 1573.748 1493.912 2576.932 2449.862 393.311
In essence, we test for the presence of a weather effect on liquidity in the 
electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Weather 
lends   itself   for   an   examination   of   patterns   in   liquidity   since   it   is   an 
economically exogenous variable not subject to data snooping (Roll (1992)), 
33i.e. the hypotheses were not chosen to explain an established pattern in 
liquidity.
The   empirical   evidence   suggests   that   sky   coverage   has   a   statistically 
significant influence on liquidity. Specifically, the cloudier the sky, the lower 
the transaction costs. On overcast days, market makers provide less liquidity 
than in sunshine. Overall, the more liquid a stock, the less value Designated 
Sponsors add in injecting liquidity.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigates the weather effect on liquidity in the electronic trading 
system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. While this phenomenon was 
first documented for stock returns, more recent studies find weather to 
influence liquidity in stock trading, potentially through moods and sentiments 
of market makers. The choice of the exchange liquidity measure XLM enables 
us to directly test for a weather effect on liquidity induced by market makers.
In fact, the empirical evidence suggests a significant weather effect on 
liquidity in Xetra. The more clouds in the sky, the lower are the execution 
costs, and the higher the liquidity. Interestingly, in such weather, market 
makers inject less liquidity than in sunshine. This could be due to market 
makers being more risk averse on overcast days, or it could result from high 
natural   liquidity   in   the   market   so   that   market   makers   add   less   value. 
Analogously, the more liquid a stock, the less additional benefit the market 
maker provides.
The finding that cloudy skies correspond with  high liquidity in Xetra is 
inconsistent with the results presented by Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) for the 
New York Stock Exchange. We suggest that future research further analyzes 
the weather effect on liquidity by extending the sample period and by 
providing international evidence. Furthermore, it should be tested whether 
trading strategies can be derived from these findings that are profitable net of 
transaction costs. In light of our results, investors should primarily trade in 
Xetra on overcast days.
344 Designated   Sponsors   on   Xetra   –   Is   One   Designated 
Sponsor Enough?
Abstract
This paper tests for the impact of Designated Sponsors on liquidity in the 
electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. By applying 
the Exchange Liquidity Measure XLM, we separate the natural liquidity in the 
order book from the liquidity provided by market makers. 
The empirical results suggest that Designated Sponsors improve liquidity and 
that the increase in a number of Designated Sponsors improves liquidity 
further. 
354.1 Introduction
Demsetz (1968) identifies the lack of “predictable immediacy of exchange in 
financial markets” as a fundamental trading problem that occurs because 
buyers and sellers arrival is not synchronized. As a result, there might be no 
counterparty at a time when liquidity is demanded.  It is especially true for less 
liquid firms. Such trading uncertainty can be mitigated by the regular presence 
of a market maker. Garbade and Silber (1979) and Grossman and Miller 
(1998) look at the role of a market maker and demonstrate that market 
makers, through maintaining market presence, reduce temporary imbalances 
in order flow and lower investors’ price risks of delayed trade.
The role of market makers and their impact on market quality has received 
considerable attention in the area of financial market design. Other studies 
include   Madhavan   and   Smidt   (1993),   Madhavan   and   Sofianos   (1998), 
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000). It was demonstrated that when the 
limit orders are added to the market model as a competition to the market 
makers,   the   bid-ask   spread   is   being   reduced   significantly;   see 
Barclays,Christie,Harris,Kandel   and   Schulz   (1999)   who   studied   the 
introduction of limit orders to NASDAQ in 1997. 
Electronic market structure does not eliminate the market making function, 
although it possibly modifies it. Few automated continuous markets function 
without some form of market making activity.  Studies by Seppi (1997), 
Viswanathan and Wang (2002) and Parlour and Seppi (2003) demonstrated 
that designated dealers could increase the supply of liquidity offered by the 
public limit orders. Depending on the extend of the immediacy demands, often 
market making is encouraged by the exchanges, through agreements that 
impose obligations of posting two-sided quotes in return for some other 
benefits. In other cases, market-making activity arises endogenously and for-
profit as a result of the demand for immediacy.
Market makers contribute to liquidity by enabling executions of orders that 
otherwise would have remained unexecuted.  The empirical evidence on the 
correlation between participation rate of market makers and trading volume is 
36mixed. Gerke and Bosch (1999) studied the role of Designated Sponsors on 
Xetra in the segment of Neuer Markt for small stocks. They found that the 
participation rate of Designated Sponsors in the trading volume is around 
8.9%   in   1998.   They   also   found   a   negative   correlation   between   the 
participation rate and volume. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) analysed the 
specialist market on the NYSE and also found a negative correlation between 
trading volume and the rate of participation of the specialists in trading. On the 
contrary, Freihuber, Kehr, Krahnen and Theissen (1998) showed positive 
correlation between participation rate of the specialists on the floor-based 
trading platform of Frankfurt Exchange and the trading volume. This is 
explained by the competition of floor-based trading with trading in Xetra order 
book in the same stocks.
Taking into consideration that Designated Sponsors have some price setting 
latitude, their activities have potential impact on price volatility. It was shown 
that for the specialist-based model, specialist might increase volatility (Stoll 
and Whaley (1990)) or to reduce volatility (Madhavan and Panchapagesan 
(2000))   who   based   their   analyses   on   NYSE.   Freihuber,   Krahnen   and 
Theissen (2001) showed that a Makler on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(FSE) Floor also decreases the price volatility. Venkataraman and Waisburd 
(2007) in the study of the Euronext order book showed that designated 
dealers contribute to the lower variability in returns and trading volume. 
Microstructure theory suggests two arguments in favour of multiple market 
makers: a) competition argument (Glosten (1989), Bernhardt  and Hughson 
(1997), Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000), Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005)) 
and b) “classic” inventory-sharing, (Stoll (1978); Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983)).
In quote-driven markets, the increase in number of market makers in the 
dealer market increases liquidity due to the introduced competition.  Ho and 
Stoll (1983), Grossmann and Miller (1988) and Leach and Madhavan (1993) 
show the negative correlation between the number of market makers and 
spread. This is consistent with the competitive model of dealer pricing. The 
same results demonstrated Gerke and Bosch (1999) in the study of Neuer 
Markt stocks on the Xetra trading platform, the largest effect being seen in the 
increase of market makers from one to two and smaller effects with more than 
37two market makers. They also showed that the spread to the large extent is 
explained   by   the   market   capitalisation.   Bosch   (2001)   also   reports   a 
significantly positive correlation between the liquidity in a stock in Xetra and 
the number of market makers acting in it.
Menkveld (2007) on Euronext showed that the quoted spread decreased in 
relation to the number of designated market makers (DMM) with diminishing 
marginal effect (2% for one DMM to 1% for eight DMMs). This is consistent 
with the theory of competition among DMMs and the theory of risk sharing. 
The study of Bongard and Klar (2006) of Designated Sponsors on Xetra 
(stocks selections from MDAX, SMAX and NEMAX indices) while using 
spread data finds that trading with more than one Designated Sponsor 
reduces the order processing and inventory cost component of the spread. 
However, only having more than three Designated Sponsors significantly 
reduced the spread estimate at a level of 7%. 
In order to examine how market makers contribute to the liquidity, we first 
present our hypotheses in section 4.2, before section 4.3 introduces some 
institutional details about the electronic trading platform Xetra. Section 4.4 
explains the methodology and describes the dataset. The empirical results are 
presented and discussed in section 4.5, with section 4.6 concluding.
4.2 Testable Hypothesis
This paper tests for market maker contribution to liquidity on the German 
electronic trading platform Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Specifically, 
we raise four research questions.
First, we analyse the relation between natural liquidity and the stock specific 
variables like market capitalisation, trading volume, volatility and price. In light 
of Gerke and Bosch (1999), we hypothesise that natural liquidity is higher in 
the stocks with higher market capitalisations.  
Second, we examine the effect of the presence of Designated Sponsors and 
total liquidity.  We expect that market makers’ contribution to liquidity is 
significant and it is more pronounced in the stocks with lower natural  liquidity.
38Third, we investigate the influence on liquidity of multiple market makers 
acting in one stock. In light of Bosch (2001) and Bongard and Klar (2006), 
who report a significantly positive correlation between the liquidity in a stock in 
Xetra and the number of market makers acting in it, we assume that injected 
liquidity rises with the number of market makers. 
Finally, we study if market markers are particularly attracted to enter stocks 
with higher natural liquidity.  This hypothesis aims to test whether Designated 
Sponsors have a preference to act as liquidity providers in more liquid stocks. 
We contribute to the ongoing debate about the relation between market 
makers and liquidity by testing the liquidity provided by maker makers in the 
electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. Rather than 
using bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, we apply the exchange liquidity 
measure (XLM) introduced by Gomber et al. (2002). The construction of this 
variable enables us to distinguish between the effect on liquidity provided by 
the market maker, and the level of liquidity present in the market without the 
market maker’s activities, i.e. natural liquidity.
4.3 Screen-based Stock Trading in Germany via Xetra
Xetra is a fully electronic open limit order book run by the German Stock 
Exchange, Deutsche Börse AG, in Frankfurt (Main)
13.  It started to operate in 
November   1997   and   is   currently   open   daily   from   9.00am   to   5.30pm. 
Continuous trading is interrupted by an opening, an intraday and one closing 
auction, which concentrate liquidity. Financial institutions, securities trading 
houses and brokers can participate in Xetra trading independently of their 
location. Trading in Xetra is anonymous, with a central counterparty (CCP) 
clearing the offsetting orders. On busy days, more than 2 million trades per 
day are executed in Xetra.
Tradable instruments are equities, certificates, warrants, exchange-traded 
funds, and subscription rights. Deutsche Börse groups many of these together 
in indices. The most prominent equity index is the German blue-chip index 
13  The information in this section is based on Deutsche Börse’s website, 
http://deutsche-boerse.com, unless stated otherwise
39DAX, comprising the 30 stocks with the largest market capitalisation. TecDAX 
consists of the 30 largest technology stocks that are not included in the DAX. 
In our sample period, 3% of total equities turnover was originated by TecDAX 
equities. Equities can be traded in all order sizes in Xetra, and orders are 
executed according to price-time priority.
Transaction fees are only charged for executed orders. These fees amount to 
0.48 basis points, a minimum of 0.60 Euros and a maximum of 18.00 Euros 
per order. For example, an executed order of 1 million Euros costs 48.00 
Euros in fees. Discounts are available for computer-generated orders, i.e. 
algorithmic trading. Xetra’s function XetraBest ensures full and immediate 
execution at a price that is automatically better than the order book, and fixed 
clearing fees are waived.
Market Makers are called ‘Designated Sponsors’ and provide additional 
liquidity, especially in less liquid stocks, by offering binding quotes for both 
buys and sells. These quotes are required to have a certain maximum bid-ask 
spread and a certain minimum quote size. Banks and securities firms act as 
Designated Sponsors. During volatility interruptions, Designated Sponsors still 
enter quotes for their stocks. In principle, a Designated Sponsors can support 
more than one stock, and equally a stock can have several Designated 
Sponsors acting in it. Less liquid stocks can only be traded continuously if 
they have been adopted by at least one Designated Sponsor. 
 In addition to the function of providing liquidity, Designated Sponsors may 
offer   listed   companies   additional   services   such   as   research   reports, 
preparation of analyst presentations or active distribution of shares. Such 
services may be either paid for or free, but the Exchange does not regulate or 
intervene in this part of the relationship between Designated Sponsors and 
the issuers. As a benefit for Designated Sponsors, Deutsche Börse waves 
transaction fees (trading and clearing fees), subject to full compliance with the 
performance requirements. 
Designated Sponsors’ quoting must satisfy certain performance requirements 
stipulated by Deutsche Börse AG with respect to the trading characteristics of 
the respective security (e.g. its Exchange Liquidity Measure). These criteria 
40include: minimum quote size (smallest, permissible number of stocks on buy 
and sell side); maximum bid/ask spread of the quotes (largest permissible 
spread   between   bid-   and   ask   limit);   reaction   time   parameters   (i.e.   in 
answering a quote request); participation rules (i.e. percent of the time to be 
present in the order book). For example, TecDAX stocks require minimum 
quote size at 20,000EUR, and the maximum spread is no more than 0.10EUR 
if the stock price is below 1 EUR; for the price from 1 EUR to 2 EUR it is 10% 
and from the price of 2 EUR to 5.60 EUR it is maximum 0.20 EUR. Above 
5.60EUR the spread is set not more than 2,5%.
Designated Sponsors may resign as a whole or with respect to specified 
securities by submitting a written notice.  Five exchange days after the receipt 
of such notice, the Designated Sponsor shall no longer be authorized or 
obliged to supply quotes for the securities concerned.  
4.4 Methodology and Data
An examination of the market maker effect on liquidity requires defining a 
variable that captures liquidity. We use the Exchange Liquidity Measure XLM 
(Gomber et  al.  (2005)), which   measures the  cost of  a  roundtrip  trade 
dependently on order size. The German Stock Exchange has been calculating 
XLM based on all information in the order book, i.e. including the hidden part 
of iceberg orders, for all stocks traded continuously in Xetra since July 2002. 
XLM therefore provides a more comprehensive analysis of transaction costs 
than the bid-ask spread.
Constructing XLM starts with the weighted average price P at which an order 
of a given size V can be settled immediately, separately for buys (B) and sells 
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14  100 basis points equal 1 percent.
41for buys and sells, respectively, with  t M  being the quote midpoint at time t. 
Adding these up yields the cost of the roundtrip transaction,
) ( ) ( ) ( , , V XLM V XLM V XLM t S t B t + =  .The higher are the transaction costs, the 
higher is XLM, and the lower is the liquidity.
This liquidity variable XLM comes in two flavours. Natural XLM measures the 
liquidity in the market without that provided by market makers. Total XLM, by 
contrast, includes that part of liquidity that is injected into the order book by 
market makers. Thus, this choice of liquidity variable enables us to test 
directly for the effect of market makers on liquidity. Because XLM captures 
transaction costs and these are inversely related to liquidity, total XLM is 
smaller than natural XLM. In other words, the presence of market makers 
reduces execution costs. The XLM data are based on hypothetical order sizes 
of 10,000 EUR, 25,000 EUR, and 50,000 EUR, which are included in the 
regression as volume classes.
Deutsche Börse AG provided daily XLM, trading volume data, open, high, low 
and close stock price for all TecDAX stocks for the two-year period from 1 
January 2004 to 31 December 2005. This dataset includes natural and total 
liquidity, so that the liquidity injected by market makers can be derived. We 
include in our sample 16 stocks that belonged to TecDAX for at least two 
consecutive   months   in   our   sample   period   and   for   which   at   least   one 
Designated Sponsor was acting.
We eliminated the stocks with the significant non-stationary mean or stocks 
with visible shocks or discontinuity. We believe this coincide with the entry or 
exit from TecDAX or other company specific behaviour. This results in a 
dataset with 24,666 observations for all parameters.  We also received the 
information on the changes in the Designated Sponsors over 2004-2005 
periods, including a date of change. Overall, we have at different times 8 
stocks with 1 DS, 10 stocks with 2 Designated Sponsors, 6 stocks with 3 
Designated Sponsors, 3 stocks with 4 Designated Sponsors and 1 stock with 
5 Designated Sponsors. Over time of the study, several stocks started with a 
larger number of Designated Sponsors but the number decreased over time.
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics on our dataset.
42Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
This Table reports for the cross section of instruments of the TecDAX means and 
standard deviations for the average daily volume in million EUR, for the XLM natural 
and XLM total in basis points. XLM mean is calculated for all three-volume classes of 
10,000 EUR, 25,000 EUR, and 50,000 EUR.
XLM natural in 
basis points
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Previous research shows that the liquidity is a function of price, volume and 
volatility,   see   for   example   Stoll   (2000).   It   was   shown   in   Benston   and 
Hagerman (1974) and, most recently, by Theissen (1998) for study of Neuer 
Markt stocks that the bid-ask spreads are strongly influenced by trading 
43volume and market capitalisation. A similar relationship is expected for XLM 
as well. Therefore, we gather data on free float, number of shares issued and 
the resulting market capitalisation. 
Using  the  approach  developed  in  Theissen  (1998)  for  the  definition of 
determinants of bid-ask spread, in the regression analysis of liquidity we use 
the variables of the logarithmic market capitalisation, number of DSs and 
trading volume. In order to avoid risks of multicollinearity, in the regression 
we will use the trading volume as a Turnover-Ratio defined as the ratio of 
trading   volume   and   market   capitalisation.   There   is   no   significant 
correlation between market capitalisation and turnover-ratio. We calculate 
Volatility as difference between daily highest price minus lowest price divided 
by close price and we take a logarithm of this.  Volume Class represents the 
size of the hypothetical order that is sent to the order book in order to 
measure XLM. To see the results more clearly, we divide Volume Class by 
1000.
Model (1)
XLMnatural i = α + β1Turnover Ratio  i+ β2 Log Volatility i  + β3 Log Markcap i  + 
β4Volume Classi+ β5Pricei
Further, we study empirically whether the presence of Designated Sponsors 
and the quantity of Designated Sponsors that a firm hires matters for liquidity 
supply. To study the total liquidity or the XLM value that is calculated taking 
into consideration the presence of Designated Sponsors in the order book, we 
use the same variables as above but add the number of Designated Sponsors 
as an explanatory variable.
Model (2)
XLMtotal i = α + β1Turnover Ratio i+ β2 log Volatilityi   + β3 log Markcapi     + β4 
Volume Classi + β5Price I + β6  NumberDSs I
Natural XLM de facto stands for the case of trading with no Designated 
Sponsors contributing to liquidity. This would mean that the total XLM could 
44be also explained by using natural XLM as an explanatory variable.  The new 
model (3) looks as follows:
Model (3)
XLMtotal i = α + β1 Volume Classi + β2 NumberDSs I   + β3 mean XLM naturali    
The   natural   XLM   dataset   could   have   several   problems   related   to 
autocorrelation within 1 stock and different stock-specific development. The 
first model shows significant heteroskedacity in the residuals. To overcome 
this problem, we calculated XLM mean as a mean of all daily XLMs for a 
specific stock over the 2 years time period. The new model shows significantly 
improved histogram. The introduction of XLM mean also reduces the impact 
of any stock specific development. 
Model (4) modifies the model (3) in such that it tests for the change in total 
XLM due to the increase in the number of Designated Sponsors. We use the 
dummy variables 2DSs, 3DSs and 4DSs.
Model   (5)   studies   the   question   if   designated   Sponsors   are   particularly 
attracted to enter the stocks with higher natural liquidity. To study this, we 
construct a model in which the variable Nr of DSs becomes a dependant 
variable:
Model (5)
NumberDSs I = α + β1Turnover Ratio i+ β2 log Volatilityi  + β3 log Markcapi    + β4 
Pricei + β5 mean XLM naturali    
4.5 Empirical Results
The primary goal of this paper is to determine market maker effects on 
liquidity   in   the   electronic   trading   system   Xetra   at   the   Frankfurt   stock 
exchange. The choice of the XLM measure for liquidity enables us to test 
directly for the influence of market makers and multiple market makers on 
injected liquidity. Table 4.2 presents the empirical results.
45First, we test the link between natural liquidity and stock-specific factors like 
market capitalisation, trading volume, price and volatility. Natural liquidity is 
the level of liquidity in the market without any contribution by market makers. 
In Model (1) we see that the share price has very small explanatory power. 
The market capitalization has highest explanatory value and is inversely 
related with cost of liquidity.  Turnover ratio is also inversely related to XLM. 
Volatility also has significant explanatory power. The remaining part of natural 
XLM should be explained by other stock-specific factors as well as general 
market conditions. This empirical result is consistent with the findings of 
Gerke and Bosch (1999) that showed that liquidity is higher in the stocks with 
higher market capitalisations.  
Second, we examine the effect of the presence of Designated Sponsors and 
total liquidity.  We expect that market makers’ contribution to liquidity is 
significant. In the Model (2) in Table 4.2, we see that his relation is statistically 
significant and negative, implying that the higher is total liquidity, the lower the 
liquidity contribution by market makers.  This result is confirmed in the Model 
(3)   that   tests   for   the   relation   between   total   XLM   and   natural   XLM   in 
combination   with   the   number   of   Designated   Sponsors   as   explanatory 
variables. This result is in line with our hypothesis that market makers have a 
favourable effect on liquidity.
Moreover, we investigate if more Designated Sponsors acting for a particular 
stock reduce execution costs more strongly than fewer Designated Sponsors 
would. The estimated coefficient on the number of Designated Sponsors is 
statistically   significant   and   negative.   Hence,   the   larger   the   number   of 
Designated Sponsors acting for one particular stock, the lower the total XLM. 
This result is in line with our hypothesis that more market makers have a 
favourable effect on liquidity.  In Model (4) we see that especially the increase 
to three Designated Sponsors significantly increases the liquidity. The result is 
consistent with Bosch (2001) and Bongard and Klar (2006), who report a 
significantly positive correlation between the liquidity in a stock in Xetra and 
the number of market makers acting in it. Our results also confirm Bongard 
and Klar (2006) findings that having three Designated Sponsors significantly 
increase liquidity.  In Appendix 4.1 we provide an alternative model for testing 
46the impact of multiple Designated Sponsors. This model also confirms the 
most significant increase in liquidity with three Designated Sponsors. 
Finally, we examine the relation between the number of Designated Sponsors 
and the natural liquidity of a stock. We assumed that Designated Sponsors 
might be attracted more to act in stocks with higher natural liquidity.
Table 4.2: Regression Results
Std. errors in brackets; *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level









































































2 0.565 0.610 .861 .862 0.167
F-statistics 6004 6029 50920 38468 1162
However, it is possible that here the problem or endogeneity or two-way 
causality may exist between dependent (number of  Designated Sponsors) 
and independent (XLM natural) variables. This implies that the regression 
coefficient in OLS regression is biased and it is better to use instrumental 
variable regression instead of OLS The endogeneity problem is particularly 
47relevant in the context of time series analysis of causal processes. It is 
common for some factors within a causal system to be dependent for their 
value in period N on the values of other factors in the causal system in period 
N-1. An OLS regression was performed to examine the explanatory power of 
natural XLM and the number of Designated Sponsors and the residuals were 
stored. The Pearson correlation of the error term with natural XLM and 
number of Designated Sponsors was calculated and no significant correlation 
was found. The explanatory variable is not correlated with the error term. It 
means that we can use OLS regression. 
In Model (5) we see that adj. R 
2 is only 16.7%. The largest explanatory effect 
lies with  turnover ratio and it is positively correlated to the number of 
Designated   Sponsors.   Interestingly,   market   capitalisation   is   negatively 
correlated with the number of Designated Sponsors. Thus, we conclude that 
there is no evidence that Designated Sponsors are particularly attracted to 
select stocks with high market capitalisation or high natural liquidity.   There 
are clearly a lot of other factors that should explain the decision of Designated 
Sponsors to enter an instrument, being for example a private compensation 
by the issuer, other strategic reasons of gaining issuer corporate banking 
business, etc. 
This is consistent with the Designated Sponsor model run at the Deutsche 
Boerse AG (see Appendix 4.2 for details). Most Designated Sponsors enter a 
stock because of other reasons. For example, Makler at Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange Floor becomes a Designated Sponsor on Xetra usually in the same 
stocks in which he is a monopolistic specialist in order to have more cost 
effective off-setting of his positions. Thus, he is not guided by the desire to be 
in more liquid stocks. Another category of  Designated Sponsors  enter the 
stock as a package offered to issuers, which includes IPO services, corporate 
banking and so on. In the times of a significant number of IPOs, many banks 
decide to become Designated Sponsors in order to demonstrate their ability 
and use it as an argument to win new coming issuers that plan an IPO. So, 
this type of  Designated Sponsor  also does not enter a stock for liquidity 
reasons.   Only   a   third   category   of   Xetra   members   become  Designated 
Sponsors  for the reasons of cost benefits of this function for their trading 
48strategies. These members usually run proprietary trading across several 
exchanges and, depending on their strategies, most likely will be interested in 
a relatively liquid stock.
4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the market marker effect on liquidity in the electronic 
trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt stock exchange. While the contribution 
of market makers to liquidity was first documented for dealer (quote-driven) 
markets, more recent studies find market makers to influence the liquidity in 
the order-driven markets as well. The choice of liquidity measure enables us 
to directly test for an effect on liquidity induced by market makers.
In fact, the empirical evidence suggests a significant market maker effect on 
liquidity in Xetra. The more Designated Sponsors in a stock, the lower the 
execution costs, and the higher the liquidity. 
In line with other studies we see that the presence of Designated Sponsors in 
the order book improves liquidity and decreases total XLM. We also see that 
the increase from one to more Designated Sponsors in a stock brings further 
benefits to liquidity. Especially large improvement is achieved in the move to 
three  Designated   Sponsors.   Consistent   with   expectations,   Designated 
Sponsors contribute more to the liquidity in the larger order sizes (i.e. volume 
classes).
The study did not confirm that Designated Sponsors are attracted to more 
liquid stocks, at least in our sample of TecDAX. Nevertheless, we believe that 
such result is consistent with the Designated Sponsor model run on Xetra. It is 
because Designated Sponsors enter a stock for the variety of other reasons 
than just liquidity. Also, Deutsche Boerse AG separates very liquid stocks into 
a separate category for which the presence of Designated Sponsors is not 
required in order to be included in the continuous trading on Xetra. It is based 
on the experience that liquidity providers do not improve liquidity in very liquid 
stocks.
We suggest that future research further analyses the multiple market maker 
effect on liquidity by extending the sample of stocks to small-caps (SDAX, etc) 
49or extending the sample period. Furthermore, it should be tested whether 
trading strategies can be derived from these findings that are profitable net of 
transaction costs. In light of our results, lower transactions costs could be 
observed in stocks with multiple market makers.
50Appendix 4.1:  Alternative Model for Testing the Impact of Multiple 
Designated Sponsors 
Table A4.1: Alternative Model for Impact of Multiple DSs
Std. errors in brackets; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
(1)                    (2)
XLM Total/
1,2 or 4 DSs
XLM Total/
























In Model (1) we see that: 
- total XLM with one DS is equal 20.072 bp 
- total XLM with two DSs is already lower at 17.197 bp.
Similarly, in Model (2) we see that:
- total XLM with one DS is equal 20.072 bp
- total XLM with 3 DSs is lower at 11.2 bp.
We see that the largest gains for liquidity are achieved with three Designated 
Sponsors.  Having four Designated Sponsors does not improve situation 
further. 
51Appendix 4.2:  Types of Designated Sponsors and their Motivation
Stock Exchanges often offer trading incentives to market makers in the order 
book. We believe that these incentives often serve as one of the reasons for 
market makers to take a stock. We can identify several types of motivation of 
trading firms to become Designated Sponsors on Xetra:
a) Proprietary traders: proprietary trading firms that execute their trading 
strategies   in   certain   instruments   or   indices   could   benefit   by   acting   as 
Designated Sponsor in related stocks by reducing transaction fees
b)   Makler   offsetting   positions:   the   Maklers   on   the   Frankfurt   Stock 
Exchange Floor trading act as monopolistic specialists in the same stocks that 
are traded on Xetra, an electronic order book. Maklers usually service small 
orders, which often represent retail trading. To minimize their inventory risks, 
Maklers prefer to offset their positions by parallel trading on Xetra. To do so, a 
Makler might want to benefit from reduced transaction costs on Xetra acting 
as Designated Sponsors.
c) Corporate banking: many banks try to win corporate banking deals 
from listed firms by offering them full service packages including liquidity 
provision, analyst coverage, etc. This might be done for a defined fee or free-
of-charge and subject to other business delivered to the bank. Such firms act 
as Designated Sponsors not to complement their trading strategies but simply 
to provide promised services. It is possible that such firms take especially 
“reserved” or low risk liquidity provision strategy by which they fulfil all 
Designated Sponsors obligations set by the Exchange but aim to avoid being 
executed. Such behaviour can be a large contributor to the overall very low 
Designated Sponsors execution ratio (Gerke and Bosch (1999)) showed that 
in Neuer Markt stocks in 1998 Designated Sponsors execution ratio was 
8.9%. TecDAX is a later index that was created on the basis of Neuer Markt).
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This paper provides empirical evidence on the intraday pattern of trading 
costs for German small cap stocks in the electronic trading system Xetra at 
the   Frankfurt   Stock   Exchange.   Theoretical   papers   draw   ambiguous 
conclusions as to whether trading costs should increase or decrease with 
concentrated liquidity, and there is only very limited empirical evidence on 
intraday execution costs for stock trading in Germany. We investigate the 
XLM variable, which is a more comprehensive measure of trading costs than 
conventional indicators such as the bid-ask spread or trading volume. The 
empirical evidence for the TecDAX stocks under investigation suggests a 
reverse-J shaped intraday profile for execution costs. Thus, trading is most 
expensive in the first 30 minutes after Xetra opens, and it is cheapest at the 
time when the NYSE starts trading. We conclude that cross-border integration 
of stock exchanges fosters market quality.
15  The earlier version of this paper is under submission to International Review of Financial Analysis 
co-authored by Christiane Goodfellow and Dirk Schiereck.
535.1 Introduction
Market microstructure theory predicts the presence of intraday patterns in the 
bid-ask   spread,  trading   volume,   and   stock  return   volatility  (Admati   and 
Pfleiderer (1988), Brock and Kleidon (1992), Madhavan et al. (1997)). In fact, 
numerous   studies   provide   empirical   evidence   of   different   intraday 
seasonalities on different trading platforms (e.g. Abhyankar et al. (1997) for 
the London Stock Exchange, Foster and Viswanathan (1990) for the New 
York Stock Exchange, Chan et al. (1995) for Nasdaq stocks, or Hamao and 
Hasbrouck (1995) for the Tokyo Stock Exchange). This finding has two 
implications. First, trading costs vary across the day, which is directly relevant 
to investors. Second, it confirms that the institutional design of a trading 
platform affects trading quality and is therefore of interest to exchanges that 
are, in principle, competing for trading volume.
We test for the presence of intraday regularities of liquidity for small cap 
stocks in the electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
Unlike most previous studies investigating trading volume or the spread as 
proxies for liquidity, we examine liquidity directly by studying the exchange 
liquidity measure (XLM) introduced by Gomber et al. (2005). This variable 
captures real-time order book execution situations by sending hypothetical 
orders to the order book at every minute of trading. In contrast to previous 
studies, we focus on TecDAX stocks, the 30 largest technology stocks that 
are not included in the DAX, and we investigate the intraday patterns for the 
current opening hours of Xetra. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop a model with uninformed liquidity 
traders and informed traders who act based on private information. While 
liquidity traders have to trade a certain amount for their liquidity or portfolio 
balancing needs, they have some discretion over when exactly to place their 
orders. It is most advantageous for them to trade at times of heavy trading 
activity, when their orders do not influence the price and can be settled 
immediately and cheaply. As a result, liquidity trading is concentrated at 
certain times of the day. These are also preferred trading times for informed 
54traders. If they share the same private information, competition among these 
informed   traders   is   beneficial   for   liquidity   traders,   leading   to   further 
concentration of liquidity. If informed traders with diverse private information 
enter the market, prices become more informative, from which also liquidity 
traders   benefit.   Even   then   is   it   advantageous   for   liquidity   traders   to 
concentrate their activities. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) further show that 
these periods of concentrated trading have higher stock return volatilities than 
times with lower trading volume. Heavy trading at the open and close of a 
stock exchange could be initiated by nondiscretionary liquidity traders, as they 
cannot trade either beforehand or afterwards. This trading behaviour of 
uninformed and informed traders results in observed intraday patterns.
In summary, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) find high-volume periods to be 
caused by comparatively low transaction costs. In this model, transaction 
costs only arise as liquidity traders pay the profits of informed traders. 
Subrahmanyam (1991) extends the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) model by 
introducing risk-averse informed traders. As these enter the market, liquidity 
reduces,  with   trading   costs  rising.  Discretionary  liquidity  traders  will   be 
dropping out of the market to avoid the increased trading costs, leaving the 
market to nondiscretionary traders and informed traders. For both these types 
of   market   participants,   the   motives   for  trade   lie   outside   of  the   model. 
Madhavan (1992) adds that the number and size of trades also affect the 
spread, rather than just trading volume. For a given volume, a stock with a 
few large trades has a wider spread than a security with many small trades.
Brock and Kleidon (1992) extend the Merton (1971) model by allowing stock 
trading to periodically stop (at the close of the exchange) and resume (at the 
open of the exchange), and they apply their theoretical findings to the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In this model, trading volume increases at the 
open and close, and prices become less elastic. At the open, investors 
rebalance their portfolios taking into account information that only became 
available over night, when trading was impossible. Similarly, before trading 
stops for the night, portfolio compositions will be different compared to earlier 
in the day when trading remains possible. For example, in order to limit 
overnight exposure, traders tend to close out positions before the exchange 
55shuts for the day. The intuition for less elastic prices is that the monopolist 
specialist at the NYSE will widen the spread in times of higher trading 
demand. Grossman and Miller (1988) argue that spreads are larger during 
high-volume periods even if there is competition among the market makers. 
This conclusion is at odds with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).
Madhavan et al. (1997) derive a structural model that explains intraday 
variations in price volatility and spreads. Information flow and trading frictions 
are   found   to   be   the   key   contributors   to   intraday   patterns.   Information 
asymmetry decreases during the day as market makers learn from the order 
flow (Madhavan (1992)) and as overnight information is incorporated in 
security prices. By contrast, inventory costs increase during the day as 
dealers face costs from holding inventory over night. Order processing costs 
are independent of the time of day. The regularities in these three spread 
components explain that spreads are highest in the morning, decrease during 
the day and increase again slightly at the end of the trading day.
Empirical studies for the NYSE find reverse J-shaped patterns (e.g. McInish 
and Wood (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), Lee et al. (1993)) in the 
bid-ask spread, which is a proxy for the implicit transaction costs. This result 
does not necessarily apply to the electronic trading platform Xetra at the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, since the latter is an anonymous open limit order 
book, while the NYSE has a specialist.
In fact, the empirical evidence for electronic trading at the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange suggests a U-shaped intraday pattern for roundtrip transaction 
costs for DAX and non-DAX stocks (Gomber et al. (2005), Wuensche et al. 
(2007))
16. On 3 November 2003, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange brought 
forward its closing time from 8.00 pm to 5.30 pm. The sample period in 
Gomber et al. (2005) is August 2002 and thus before the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange brought forward its closing time. At that time, transaction costs only 
started rising after 5.30pm. Gomber et al. (2005) argue that institutional 
investors closed their positions just before the exchange shut for the night, 
thereby raising transaction costs between 5.30 pm and 8.00 pm. Wuensche et 
16  Kopp et al. (2008) also investigate intraday data from Xetra. However, their study focuses 
on factors determining liquidity rather than an intraday pattern of execution costs.
56al. (2007), by contrast, examine January to March 2004, when Xetra closed at 
5.30 pm. They attribute the U-shape in the spread for the 30 DAX stocks to 
higher adverse selection and order processing costs in the morning and to 
higher order processing costs shortly before 5.30 pm.
In essence, there are contradicting theories regarding the intraday pattern of 
trading costs. Empirical evidence for the German electronic trading platform 
Xetra is limited. While Wuensche et al. (2007) examine intraday regularities of 
the bid-ask spread of the 30 most liquid Xetra stocks, we focus on the more 
comprehensive liquidity measure XLM and study 30 less liquid, more volatile 
stocks constituting the TecDAX index. The empirical results of Gomber et al. 
(2005) regarding the intraday pattern of execution costs are somewhat out of 
date as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has since changed its opening hours. 
We overcome these shortcomings and contribute empirical evidence on four 
testable hypotheses.
In order to examine how trading costs vary across the day, we first present 
our hypotheses in section 5.2, before section 5.3 introduces some institutional 
details about the electronic trading platform Xetra. Section 5.4 explains the 
methodology and describes the dataset. The empirical results are presented 
and discussed in section 5.5, with section 5.6 concluding.
5.2 Testable Hypothesis
This paper tests for intraday patterns of execution costs on the German 
electronic trading platform Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Specifically, 
we raise four research questions.
First, we test whether transaction costs in Xetra follow a reverse J-shape, as 
found for the NYSE (McInish and Wood (1992), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993), Lee et al. (1993)), or a U-shape, as discovered for Xetra (Wuensche 
et al. (2007), Gomber et al. (2005)), or neither.
Second, we examine the impact of the opening of US trading on Xetra 
transaction costs. Gomber et al. (2005) find the start of futures trading in 
Chicago and the opening of the NYSE to drop liquidity in Xetra. Similarly, Giot 
57et al. (2002) show that the spread in Xetra increases just before trading starts 
in the US
17.
Third, we investigate intraday patterns of order book imbalances in Xetra. 
Ranaldo (2004) finds order book imbalances at the Swiss Exchange in Zürich 
to vary across the trading day. In particular, soon after the opening, a large 
number of buy orders is submitted, while sellers appear to lag behind by 
about an hour but subsequently provide a more stable level of liquidity during 
the day.
Fourth, we study execution possibilities across the day by counting the 
number of minutes when full order execution was possible. This is closely 
related to the third hypothesis as large order book imbalances imply limited 
execution possibilities.
We contribute new empirical evidence in several ways. First, the liquidity 
variable XLM is a more comprehensive measure of implicit transaction costs 
than trading volume or the bid-ask spread. Second, our sample period runs 
from 25 May 2006 to 23 June 2006 and thus falls into the shorter Xetra 
opening hours. Finally, we examine the 30 stocks constituting the TecDAX 
index, a mid-cap index of companies in technology sectors, rather than the 
most liquid 30 DAX stocks.
5.3 Screen-based Stock Trading in Germany via Xetra
Xetra is the fully electronic screen-based trading platform run by the German 
Stock Exchange, Deutsche Boerse AG
18. It is organised as an anonymous 
open limit order book and started to operate in November 1997. It is currently 
open daily from 9.00 am, i.e. after the opening auction, to 5.30 pm, followed 
by the closing auction. Continuous trading is interrupted by an intraday 
auction (1.00 pm to 1.01 pm). Financial institutions, securities trading houses 
and brokers can participate in Xetra trading independently of their location. 
Trading in Xetra is anonymous, with a central counterparty (CCP) clearing the 
17  We could further test for the effect of the lunch break on liquidity. The intuition behind this is 
that when traders are at lunch, they will inject less liquidity into the market than when they are 
at their desks. However, it is impossible to determine when exactly traders go to lunch. 
Moreover, the order book is balanced at the midday auction at 1.00 pm.
18  This section is based on Deutsche Börse’s website, http://deutsche-boerse.com, and on 
Goodfellow et al. (2010). A few passages have been taken from that paper.
58offsetting orders
19. On busy days, more than 2 million trades are executed in 
Xetra per day.
Tradable instruments are primarily equities, certificates, warrants, exchange-
traded funds, and subscription rights. Equities can be traded in all order sizes 
in Xetra, and orders are executed according to price-time priority.  The 
German stock exchange groups many of these together in indices. The most 
prominent equity index is the German blue-chip index DAX, comprising the 30 
stocks with the largest market capitalization.
This study focuses on TecDAX stocks, the 30 largest technology stocks that 
are not included in the DAX. In our sample period, 3% of total equities order 
book turnover was originated by TecDAX equities (Deutsche Börse (2006)). 
The limited liquidity levels in these stocks enable us to report empirical 
evidence beyond previous studies.
Market Maker activities are provided by so-called ’Designated Sponsors’ who 
offer additional liquidity and transaction opportunities, especially in less liquid 
stocks, by offering binding quotes for both buys and sells. These quotes are 
required to have a certain maximum bid-ask spread and a certain minimum 
quote size. Banks and securities firms act as Designated Sponsors. In 
principle, one Designated Sponsors can support several stocks, and equally a 
stock can have several Designated Sponsors acting in it. Less liquid stocks 
can only be traded continuously if they have been adopted by at least one 
Designated Sponsor.
Transaction fees are only charged for executed orders. These fees amount to 
0.48 basis points, a minimum of 0.60 Euros and a maximum of 18.00 Euros 
per   order.   Discounts   are   available   for   computer-generated   orders,   i.e. 
algorithmic trading. Xetra’s function XetraBest ensures full and immediate 
execution for private investors’ orders at a price that is automatically better 
than the order book, and fixed clearing fees are waived.
For stocks to be allowed to trade continuously, they have to be liquid 
according to two criteria. First, the average liquidity is measured with XLM, 
based on a 25,000-Euro order size, and has to be 100 basis points or less. 
19  See Grammig et al. (2001) and Hachmeister and Schiereck (2010) for effects of anonymity 





























Second, the average daily trading volume has to be at least 2.5 million Euros. 
Stocks   that   satisfy   these   two   criteria   are   automatically   admitted   into 
continuous trading. Stocks that fail  either criterion require at least one 
Designated Sponsor in order to be allowed to participate in continuous 
trading. Otherwise, the stock can trade in auctions only.
5.4 Methodology and Data
In order to capture liquidity, we focus on the Exchange Liquidity Measure XLM 
(Gomber et  al.  (2005)), which   measures the  cost of  a  roundtrip  trade 
dependently on order size. The German Stock Exchange has been calculating 
XLM based on all information in the order book, i.e. including the hidden part 
of iceberg orders, for all stocks traded continuously in Xetra since July 2002. 
XLM therefore provides a more comprehensive analysis of liquidity costs than 
the bid-ask spread.
Constructing XLM starts with the weighted average price P at which an order 
of a given size V can be settled immediately, separately for buys (B) and sells 
(S). The execution cost, denoted in basis points, with 100 basis points = 1%, 
is then  
 and 
for buys and sells, respectively, with Mt being the quote midpoint at time t. 
Adding these up yields the cost of the roundtrip transaction. The higher are 
the transaction costs, the higher is XLM, and the lower is the liquidity.
 
This liquidity variable XLM comes in two flavours. Natural XLM measures the 
liquidity in the market without that provided by market makers. Our study is 
based on this variable. Total XLM, by contrast, includes that part of liquidity 
that is injected into the order book by Designated Sponsors. Because XLM 
captures transaction costs and these are inversely related to liquidity, total 
XLM is smaller than natural XLM. In other words, the presence of market 
makers reduces execution costs. The XLM data are based on hypothetical 
) ( ) ( ) ( , , V XLM V XLM V XLM t S t B t + =
60order sizes of 10,000 EUR and 25,000 EUR and are calculated every minute 
during the trading day.
Unlike previous studies that focus on the most liquid stocks, we examine 
liquidity for TecDAX stocks across 22 trading days from 25 May 2006 to 23 
June 2006. These data were obtained from Deutsche Börse AG. The TecDAX 
index consists of 30 mid-cap stocks. During the sample period, one stock was 
replaced in the index. In order for the sample to be consistent across the 
period under investigation, we omit these two stocks from the analysis (i.e. the 
stock that left the index and the stock that replaced it), resulting in a dataset 
with 28 stocks continuously in the TecDAX.
The dataset contains the following information for hypothetical order sizes of 
10,000 EUR and 25,000 EUR in each minute: measures of full execution 
possibilities (partial  execution  possibilities are  ignored), XLM for natural 
liquidity (i.e. without the contribution by Designated Sponsors), and a buy or 
sell indicator. Each trading day consists of 8.5 trading hours, thus 510 
minutes, less two minutes of intraday auction. The maximum number of data 
entries per day is therefore 5102=508 for the sell and equally 508 for the buy 
side, totalling 1,016 entries.
The first research question revolves around intraday regularities of execution 
costs in Xetra. In order to investigate these, we analyse the natural XLM 
measure. This variable captures trading costs without the liquidity contribution 
by Designated Sponsors and is denominated in basis points. A reverse J-
shape pattern in execution costs is therefore equivalent to low liquidity at the 
beginning of the trading day, continuous increasing liquidity during the day, 
and liquidity remaining stable towards the end of trading. A reverse J-shape 
pattern further implies no particular effect of closing on liquidity. In other 
words, liquidity is higher in the afternoon than in the morning, with no spike at 
the end of the trading day similar to that immediately after the opening. We 
further test whether different volume classes of XLM follow the same reverse 
J-shape intraday pattern.
Based on the natural XLM data in the dataset, we calculate the variable 
MeanXLM as the average XLM for each stock in either volume class on both 
61sides of the order book across the entire sample period. Further, we calculate 
the variable DiffXLM, which is the difference between the XLM data point in 
the original dataset and the MeanXLM for the same stock, order size and side 
of the order book. DiffXLM thus measures the variation of natural XLM relative 
to its average across the 22 trading days under investigation. A negative 
DiffXLM means that natural XLM was below its average for a particular minute 
and stock. We use DiffXLM per minute as the dependent variable in the 
regression  analysis  to  test for intraday patterns in  liquidity.  We further 
construct three dummy variables to capture the trading time: Dopen = 1 for all 
trades from 9.00 am to 9.29 am and zero otherwise. Similarly, DNYSE = 1 for all 
trades from 3.30 pm to 3.59 pm and zero otherwise. Finally, Dclose = 1 for all 
trades from 5.00 pm to 5.29 pm and zero otherwise.
In order to test for the presence of intraday regularities in execution costs in 
Xetra, we estimate the regression model (1):
DiffXLMt   = α + β1  Dopen, t   + β2  D NYSE, t  + β3  D close, t  + ε t                        (1)
with t denoting trading time in minutes. This analysis is thus carried out for 
each of the 28 stocks in the sample, for each order size (10,000 EUR and 
25,000 EUR), and for both the ask and bid sides of the Xetra order book. 
Because DiffXLM is the difference between the individual XLM observations 
and their mean MeanXLM, DiffXLM is zero on average. We therefore also 
estimate   regression   (2)   without   the   intercept  α,   resulting   in   the   model 
specification:
DiffXLMt   = β1  Dopen, t   + β2  D NYSE, t  + β3  D close, t  + ε t                               (2)
The coefficient β1 captures the effect of the opening of Xetra at 9.00 am on 
the XLM liquidity measure, while the coefficient β3  indicates the impact of the 
closing time of Xetra at 5.30 pm on liquidity. DNYSE is included to test for an 
effect of the opening of the NYSE on Xetra liquidity, which is our second 
research question. If β2    is statistically significantly negative (positive), this 
would imply the U.S. opening to have a reducing (increasing) effect on 
execution costs in Xetra.
Turning to the third research question, we study order book imbalances 
across the trading day by comparing hypothetical buy orders sent to the ask-
62side of the order book with hypothetical sell orders sent to the bid-side of the 
order book for each stock. Specifically, we contrast MeanXLM on the ask side 
with MeanXLM on the bid side. The t-test indicates whether the difference 
between both order book sides is statistically significant.
The fourth research question focuses on execution possibilities. When full 
hypothetical order sizes cannot be executed, the XLM observation is ignored, 
as partial execution possibilities are not taken into account. XLM data per 
trading day give the fraction of trading minutes when full execution was 
possible. For example, an 80% XLM measure implies that in 80% of the time, 
full execution was possible, while in the remaining 20% of the time, the 
volume   in   the   order   book   was   insufficient.   Based   on   the   execution 
possibilities, we count the number of XLM data points per day and thus have 
the percentage of trading minutes when full execution was possible.
As in McInish and Wood (1992), McInish et al. (2002) and Lee et al. (1993), 
we split the trading time into 30-minute intervals, and within each interval the 
average number of minutes with full execution is calculated per share per day. 
This method preserves the characteristics of each stock in each interval and 
follows Abhyankar et al. (1997). The interval with the 2-minute intraday 
auction consists of only 28 minutes.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Intraday Pattern of Execution Costs
We first turn to the investigation of intraday patterns in liquidity. Figure 5.1 
presents the intraday profile of the DiffXLM variable for both volume classes 
and for both order book sides. This variable captures execution costs and is 
therefore inversely related to liquidity. Indeed, the execution costs follow a 
reverse J-shape. This implies that liquidity in the afternoon is higher than in 
the morning. As DiffXLM decreases in the first half of the day, liquidity is 
building up and thus trading costs are going down.
63Figure 5.1: DiffXLM Across the Trading Day
Table 5.1 presents the regression results for two  models, one with  an 
intercept, and one forcing the intercept to be zero. At the opening of Xetra, the 
dependent variable DiffXLM is statistically significantly higher by 20.27 basis 
points than the average for the trading day. This result is confirmed by the 
second model. The statistical significance of the closing of Xetra differs 
between the two models. In the first specification, the closing hour has no 
significant impact on DiffXLM. However, in the second model, the execution 
costs in the last hour of trading in Xetra are 2.52 basis points lower than the 
DiffXLM average across the day. This is driven by the early morning hours 
when XLM is highest.
64Table 5.1: Intraday Patterns in Xetra Execution Costs
DiffXLM captures the execution costs and is calculated as the difference between the 
natural XLM data point in the original dataset and the average XLM for the same 
stock, order size and side of the order book. The three dummy variables represent 
the Xetra opening (Dopen), the NYSE opening (DNYSE), and the Xetra closing (Dclose). ** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.







β1 20.268 29.681** 18.094 27.964**
β 2 -3.331 -3.603** -5.506 -6.017**









These empirical results are broadly consistent with Gomber et al. (2005) and 
Wuensche et al. (2007) who report a U-shaped intraday pattern for execution 
costs. During the period under investigation in Gomber et al. (2005), trading in 
Xetra only closed at 8.00 pm. The intraday pattern for this long trading day is 
similar to the pattern for the shorter day studied in this paper. Interestingly, 
execution costs appear to rise towards the end of the trading day, whenever 
that happens to be. This is plausible as inventory costs go up towards the 
closing of the exchange, regardless of whether that is at 5.30 pm or at 8.00 
pm. However, this rise in execution costs at the end of the trading day is 
weaker in our sample than in Gomber et al. (2005) or in Wuensche et al. 
(2007).
5.5.2 Impact of the NYSE Opening on Xetra Trading Costs
We now study the effect of the opening of the U.S. stock exchange on liquidity 
in Xetra. The NYSE opens at 9.30 am Eastern Time, which corresponds to 
3.30 pm Frankfurt Time during our sample period. Table 5.2 presents the 
empirical results for the variable DNYSE. In both models, the U.S. opening has a 
statistically significant negative impact on DiffXLM in Xetra. When the NYSE 
65opens, liquidity in Xetra goes up, thereby lowering execution costs, compared 
to the average across the day. Overall, the U.S. opening improves trading 
quality in Xetra.
This finding is at odds with Gomber et al. (2005) and Giot et al. (2002). Both 
studies report increased transaction costs in Xetra around the start of trading 
at the NYSE. However, the sample periods may account for some of the 
differences in empirical results, since Giot et al. (2002) examine August to 
October 1999, Gomber et al. (2005) analyse August 2002, while we study 
May and June 2006. Technical innovations have entered financial markets 
since the 1990s, potentially resulting in markets becoming more integrated 
across borders.
5.5.3 Intraday Patterns in Order Book Imbalances
In order to examine order book imbalances, we compare MeanXLM for the 
ask side with MeanXLM for the bid side of the Xetra order book. Table 5.2 
summarises the empirical results. 
There are order book imbalances throughout the trading day, and it appears 
that the buy side is more liquid regardless of time of the day. In other words, 
trading costs on the ask side are lower than on the bid side across the day.
The order book imbalance is largest within the first hour of Xetra opening, and 
the imbalances at Xetra closing time are low compared to the earlier trading 
times for either order size. For both order sizes, the order book imbalance is 
lowest between 3.00 pm and 3.30 pm, which coincides with the pre-opening 
at   the   NYSE.   Overall,   the   imbalance   in   the   afternoon   hours   is   less 
pronounced than in the morning hours.
66Table 5.2: Order Book Imbalances in Xetra across the Trading Day
Order book imbalances are measured by comparing MeanXLM for the ask side with 
MeanXLM for the bid side of the Xetra order book. ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. All figures are in basis points.





















9.29    
53.23 54.59 1.35 -1.47* 72.29 72.84 0.55 -.23
09.30-
09.59
33.96 35.54 1.57 -2.57** 47.81 49.56 1.75 -1.25*
10.00-
10.29
29.84 30.93 1.08 -2.10* 41.51 44.49 2.98 -2.18*
10.30-
10.59
28.08 29.27 1.19 -2.56** 39.41 41.99 2.58 -1.69*
11.00-
11.29
27.11 28.54 1.42 -2.69** 39.25 40.21 0.96 -.84
11.30-
11.59
26.69 27.17 0.48 -.89 38.21 38.28 0.07 -.06
12.00-
12.29
26.08 27.09 1.00 -1.79* 36.91 38.37 1.45 -1.36*
12.30-
12.59
26.16 26.85 0.68 -1.71* 37.59 37.17 -0.42 .43*
13.02–
13.29 
26.23 26.47 0.24 -.66 37.61 36.72 -0.90 .80
13.30-
13.59
25.31 26.13 0.82 -1.37* 36.32 36.28 -0.03 .028
14.00-
14.29
25.55 26.39 0.83 -2.12* 36.63 36.84 0.21 -.25
14.30-
14.59





24.73 24.57 -0.16 .33 32.98 33.22 0.25 -.25*
15.30-
15.59 
26.23 26.62 0.39 -.81 34.92 36.80 1.89 -1.85*
16.00-
16.29
26.01 26.55 0.53 -1.34* 35.04 36.80 1.77 -2.10*
16.30-
16.59
25.17 25.74 0.56 -1.77* 34.62 35.78 1.16 -1.56*
17.00-
17.29 
26.47 26.76 0.28 -.75 36.95 37.28 0.32 -.34
67Ranaldo (2004) reports that the Swiss Exchange is least imbalanced following 
the U.S. opening in the sample period March and April 1997. However, prior 
to that, the order imbalances at the Swiss Exchange tip over. Early in the 
morning and around lunch time, the buy side is more liquid, while the sell side 
provides larger trading volume in the remaining trading hours. By contrast, in 
Xetra, the buy side remains more liquid throughout the day. Ranaldo (2004) 
argues that the buy side is more liquid during bull market phases, and that 
buy orders are more likely information-motivated than sell orders. Sell orders, 
by contrast, primarily provide liquidity. Thus, overall market performance and 
the institutional composition of traders in our sample period may influence the 
empirical results.
5.5.4 Execution Possibilities across the Trading Day
In order to examine the execution possibilities across the trading day, we 
report the number of minutes with full execution relative to the 30 minutes in 
each 30-minute interval. This results in the percentages presented in Table 
5.3. The larger the percentage, the more often full order execution was 
possible across all stocks in the sample. Figure 5.2 shows the results detailed 
in Table 5.3. The intraday profile of execution possibilities mirrors the intraday 
pattern of transaction costs depicted in Figure 5.1.
68Figure 5.2: Execution Possibilities Across the Trading Day 
69Table 5.3: Execution Possibilities in Xetra across the Trading Day
Reported is the number of minutes with full execution possibility relative to the 30 
minutes in each 30-minute interval. The larger the percentage, the more often full 
order execution was possible across all 28 stocks in the sample. These results are 
equal for both volume classes (10,000 EUR and 25,000 EUR) and both order book 
sides (buy and sell). 
Time  Execution possibilities, in percent












15.00-15.29 US pre-opening 99.90




Not surprisingly, the results are very similar to those shown in Table 5.2. 
Large order book imbalances imply that hypothetical orders cannot be (fully) 
executed. Thus, the intraday patterns discovered for order book imbalances 
also   manifest   themselves   in   the  execution   possibilities  across  the   day. 
Execution possibilities are most limited immediately after Xetra opens. The 
midday auction appears to have only a slight effect, while the NYSE opening 
seems to increase the execution possibilities and thus improve trading quality 
in Xetra. In the last half hour of trading in Xetra, it appears that traders have 
already closed out their positions for the day, and thus liquidity reduces just 
before closing.
Comparatively limited execution possibilities immediately after the open are 
consistent with the estimation results of the regression analyses and also in 
line with the evidence presented in Gomber et al. (2005) and Wuensche et al. 
(2007).
705.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the intraday pattern of trading costs for 
small cap stocks in the electronic trading system Xetra at the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. We analyse the XLM variable, which is a more comprehensive 
liquidity measure than the bid-ask spread or trading volume. Unlike previous 
studies, we focus on 28 less liquid technology stocks in the TecDAX index 
during the current Xetra opening hours.
We find a reverse J-shaped intraday profile of XLM, implying that liquidity is 
lowest immediately after the start of trading and highest in the early afternoon. 
This time of lowest execution costs and thus highest trading quality coincides 
with the opening of the NYSE. Order book imbalances, and thus execution 
possibilities, confirm this pattern. Imbalances are highest early in the morning, 
rendering execution possibilities worst compared to the remainder of the 
trading day. Order book imbalances are lowest at U.S. pre-opening, and 
execution possibilities in Xetra are best once the NYSE has started trading.
Based on these empirical results, it is most advantageous for liquidity traders 
to place their orders in the early afternoon, while trading in the first half hour of 
opening is not recommended. Similarly, trading should not be left until the last 
half opening hour of Xetra. For informed trades, however, higher trading costs 
in the early morning could be offset by the profits from superior information. 
This might be an avenue for further research.
From the stock exchanges’ perspective, the technical integration with the spot 
market at the NYSE appears to increase liquidity. Further research could 
investigate the effect of the opening of futures trading in Chicago on Xetra. It 
can be conjectured that further integration will benefit trading quality and thus 
give the exchange an advantage in the competition for trading volume.
716 Overall Conclusions for Three Essays
Overall, this doctoral thesis follows the research objective to improve our 
understanding of the liquidity in stock markets by providing new evidence on 
the effects of various factors on liquidity by using XLM data.
To achieve this objective, this doctoral thesis comprises three essays that 
address selected issues in stock market liquidity. All three essays conduct 
original empirical research using German Xetra trading system data and the 
set of stocks that belong to German TecDAX index.  
The choice of the liquidity measure (Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM)) 
enables us to study the whole order book in a dynamic setting. The German 
Stock Exchange has been calculating XLM based on all information in the 
order book, i.e. including the hidden part of iceberg orders, for all stocks 
traded continuously in Xetra since July 2002. XLM therefore provides a more 
comprehensive analysis of liquidity costs than the bid-ask spread.
The first essay (Chapter 3) focuses on the weather effects on the stock 
market liquidity and tests for the potential influence of the cloudy weather on 
liquidity   provided   by   market   makers.   The   second   essay   (Chapter   4) 
investigates the role of designated sponsors in Xetra electronic order book 
and their contribution to stock liquidity. Finally, the third essay (Chapter 5) 
investigates the intraday effect on liquidity.  
Although different in focus and approach, all three essays contribute to the 
main challenge of developing a better understanding of the factors that 
influence liquidity in the electronic order book. 
In general, we find new evidence supporting the views of many researchers in 
capital markets that the liquidity in the electronic order book can be influenced 
by various factors.  In three different essays we document the positive impact 
on liquidity of the mood affective factor like weather, of the increase of market 
makers per instrument and of the time of the day.
Our findings fit well into the results of recent research on the weather effects 
in capital markets (Goetzmann and Zhu (2005), Flemisch et al. (2009)) and on 
72the   contribution   of   multiple   market   makers   (Bongard   and   Klar   (2006); 
Menkveld (2007)) to liquidity.  
Overall, this thesis yields new insights into the patterns of liquidity that can be 
useful for practitioners and researchers in this field. New questions that arise 
from the results should be addressed in the future research.
First of all, the exchanges can incorporate the results of my research in the 
design of market models. The impact on liquidity by the increased number of 
market makers in a stock is especially interesting in this respect and it 
provides guidance for the design of market models for less liquid instruments. 
From the stock exchanges’ perspective, the technical integration with the spot 
market at the NYSE appears to increase liquidity. Thus, further research could 
investigate the effect of the opening of futures trading in Chicago on Xetra. 
Also the impact of opening of other markets (i.e. Asia) could be investigated. It 
can be conjectured that further integration will benefit trading quality and thus 
give the exchange an advantage in the competition for trading volume.
Secondly, the findings can be used in the design of trading strategies in the 
asset management and banks’ stock trading areas. Based on these empirical 
results, it is most advantageous for liquidity traders to place their orders in the 
early   afternoon,   while   trading   in   the   first   half   hour   of   opening   is   not 
recommended. Similarly, trading should not be left until the last half opening 
hour of Xetra. For informed trades, however, higher trading costs in the early 
morning could be offset by the profits from superior information. This might be 
an avenue for further research. Furthermore, it should be tested whether 
trading strategies can be derived from these findings that are profitable net of 
transaction costs. In light of our results, lower transactions costs could be 
observed in stocks with multiple market makers as well as during trading in 
Xetra on overcast days.
For the further research, we suggest repeating these studies for another 
period and extending the sample of stocks to more illiquid instruments like 
SDAX. This could in particular be interesting to further analyse the impact of 
multiple market makers in less liquid stocks. Additionally, the analysis of high 
frequency data based on XLM for more liquid stocks (e.g. DAX) during the 
73exogenous events could yield interesting results. Furthermore, the finding that 
cloudy skies correspond with high liquidity in Xetra is inconsistent with the 
results presented by Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) for the New York Stock 
Exchange. We suggest that future research further analyzes the weather 
effect   on   liquidity   by   extending   the   sample   period   and   by   providing 
international evidence. 
Like   most   empirical   research,   it   is   important   to   consider   any   potential 
limitations of this study when interpreting the results. First of all, the nature 
and patterns of liquidity are strongly influenced by a variety of factors like 
market structure, trading rules, continuous trading versus firm quotes, the 
level and efficiency of market supervision, insider trading, order sizes and 
many more. These factors affect trading patterns of market participants, thus 
affecting   the   liquidity.   One   obvious   constraint   is   that   our   results   are 
representative for the Xetra market model. Even though the Xetra market 
model is generally quite representative of the other European market models, 
certain differences still exist, thus making the transferability of these results to 
other market and market models uncertain.
Secondly, it is important to recall that the sample of stocks used in these 
studies is limited to TecDAX stocks. This may make the results better, by 
concentrating on a group of stocks with broadly similar characteristics, but this 
may also limit the applicability of the results to other stocks.
Thirdly, the stocks that belong to the TecDAX index might be best classified 
as a medium-liquidity stocks, rather than pure less liquid stocks. Thus, the 
transferability   of   our   findings   on   other   more   illiquid   stocks   could   be 
constrained. 
Finally, it is likely that more robust results could be obtained by extending the 
sample of stocks and possibly a time period. Moreover, the data series used 
are daily in nature (apart from the study of intraday when the data is minute-
based), but a more accurate analysis can be done by using hourly or even 
minute-based data series. 
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